The 2014/2015 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa

Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

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Office of Technical Support
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INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the fourth edition of the Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa, which covers events in calendar years 2014 and 2015. This edition of the Index reports on the strength and overall viability of the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza.

The Index relies on the knowledge of CSO practitioners and researchers, who in each country form an expert panel to assess and rate seven interrelated dimensions of CSO sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image. The panel proposes a score for each dimension, which can range from 1 (indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability) to 7 (indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development). Dimension scores are averaged to produce an overall sustainability score. The Index groups all scores into three overarching categories—Sustainability Enhanced (scores from 1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7). An editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews the panel’s findings, with the aim of maintaining consistent approaches and standards so as to allow cross-country comparisons. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce corresponding narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

Readers should note that this publication focuses on the situation on the ground in 2014 and 2015. USAID notes that developments in the seven countries and territories covered by this report continue to be turbulent and that the situation in many of them is dramatically different now than it was during the period covered.

The Index is a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability in the CSO sector. The CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa complements similar publications covering other regions, which include reports on twenty-four countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, thirty countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, seven countries in Asia, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. These editions of the CSO Sustainability Index bring the total number of countries surveyed to seventy.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. We are grateful to the implementing partners, who played the critical role of facilitating the expert panel meetings and writing the country reports. We would also like to thank the many CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert panels in each country. Their knowledge, perceptions, ideas, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which the Index is based.

1 The CSO Sustainability Index for Afghanistan and CSO Sustainability Index for Pakistan are made possible by the support of the Aga Khan Foundation. The Aga Khan Foundation also provides funding for the Mali and Kenya country reports for the CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa evaluates the strength and viability of the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. This edition of the Index covers events and trends affecting CSOs over the course of 2014 and 2015.

CSOs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) operated in a tumultuous environment during 2014 and 2015, facing challenges ranging from fierce armed conflicts to severe humanitarian and economic crises. In Iraq, the so-called Islamic State militant group (otherwise known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) emerged as an increasingly potent threat, seizing territory in the western and central parts of the country in 2014. The militant group severely violated human rights, particularly those of religious minorities, women, and young girls, and its territorial expansion in Iraq prompted thousands of people to flee. Iraqi CSOs were faced with practical difficulties of operating in and around areas under the group's control. In 2015, Iraq, as well as Egypt, Lebanon, and Yemen, experienced attacks claimed by the Islamic State or its affiliates. The spread of Islamic State attacks and the group's recruitment of fighters from abroad intensified security concerns throughout the MENA region and led governments in many countries to adopt new laws and regulations aimed at countering extremist activity. Some of these measures created new restrictions for CSOs, including limits on their ability to receive foreign donor funding.

The civil war in Syria, which the Index does not cover, grew in complexity and deadliness throughout 2014 and 2015 and continued to have spillover effects into neighboring countries, including Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. All three countries, already hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), faced challenges meeting the needs of growing resident refugee and IDP populations while ensuring security and sufficient resources for host communities. Substantial foreign aid continued to flow to these countries, which helped support CSOs already working on refugee and IDP relief as well as those that adapted their scopes of work to include humanitarian aid activities.

In Yemen, meanwhile, promising signs of political reconciliation in early 2014 with the conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference faded later that year, when the Houthi militant group seized the country's capital, several government institutions, and the army. An international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched a war on the Houthis in early 2015, leading to thousands of casualties, millions of IDPs, and a new humanitarian crisis in the region. CSOs in Yemen struggled to continue operating given the armed conflict and fluid political situation. After taking over parts of the government, the Houthis began cracking down on CSOs in areas under their control. Dozens of organizations were forced to close. CSOs—particularly those working on human rights (e.g., documenting rights violations)—faced new administrative difficulties operating in Houthi-controlled areas. Many CSOs reduced activities in order to keep a lower profile and avoid being targeted.

Tensions grew between the Palestinian territories and Israel, culminating in Israeli airstrikes and a ground campaign in Gaza in the summer of 2014. The Gaza War, which devastated much of the territory's infrastructure and killed thousands of Palestinians, was followed by a series of retaliatory attacks between the two sides throughout 2015. The war had major effects on CSOs in both Gaza and the West Bank, prompting new donor funding for relief and reconstruction, and shifting CSOs’ priorities to address these urgent needs.

Countries in the region faced a range of political challenges as well. Iraq’s government, newly elected in 2014, failed to quell public discontent over corruption and poor public services, leading to widespread public protests in 2015, in which many CSOs took part. Lebanon remained without a president throughout 2014-15, and decision makers largely declined to adopt any new policies, making it difficult for CSOs to engage in effective advocacy. Despite a reconciliation agreement signed in Gaza City in mid-2014, the two governments of the Palestinian territories, led by Fatah and Hamas, remained divided. With both governments claiming registration authority over Gaza-based CSOs, the political impasse ensured continued confusion for Gazan CSOs as to what regulations and authorities they were subject to. In Jordan and Morocco, the monarchies allowed
measured steps toward reform, such as a law in Jordan to decentralize decision-making authority, and new mechanisms in Morocco to allow greater public participation in the legislative process. At the same time, both countries made efforts to minimize dissent by cracking down on expressions or activities deemed politically impermissible.

Regional turbulence both contributed to and was exacerbated by economic challenges. Many of the countries in the region struggle with high rates of poverty and unemployment. The World Bank estimates that, following the war, nearly 80 percent of Yemen’s population now lives in poverty. More than one quarter of Egyptians live below the poverty line, according to a 2015 report by the UN Development Program. More than half (54 percent) of Palestinians were unemployed in late 2015, according to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics. The drop in global oil prices in 2014 was particularly felt in Iraq, which relies on oil sales for much of its national budget. At the same time, large refugee populations strained already limited resources and overburdened infrastructure, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon. Weak economic conditions often meant reduced government funding for CSOs and a continuing reliance on foreign donors as the primary means of support.

The size of the CSO sectors in the region is difficult to gauge because official data is often unreliable or unavailable. Nonetheless, data on formally registered organizations in 2014 and 2015 reflected a wide range in the number of registered CSOs in each country. Morocco reported the largest number of organizations - 116,836 associations in 2014 according to the Ministry of Interior. According to Egypt’s Ministry of Social Solidary, there were 45,000 CSOs registered under the NGO law by the end of 2015. Lebanon’s Ministry of Interior and Municipalities reported 8,311 registered CSOs. In Jordan, by the end of 2015, there were a total of 4,854 registered associations, according to the Registry of Societies, with 393 new associations registered in 2014 and 533 in 2015. In Iraq, the federal government’s NGO Directorate reported 2,150 NGOs registered by the end of 2014, which increased to 2,591 in 2015. (Iraqi Kurdistan’s NGO Department reported approximately 2,300 NGOs registered at the end of 2014 and 2,564 NGOs one year later.) The West Bank and Gaza also reported a small CSO sector, with a total of just 2,793 CSOs registered by 2015, according to the Ministry of Interior. Numbers were not available for Yemen.

FACING LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES

In a landscape rife with security, political, and economic challenges, CSOs faced intensified legal and administrative constraints imposed by governments during 2014 and 2015. Government officials often framed these new restrictions in the context of security concerns or as measures to combat terrorism.

In Egypt, where the legal environment for CSOs continued to decline during 2014 and 2015, the government dissolved and banned hundreds of organizations suspected of having ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (which the Egyptian government formally designated a terrorist group in 2013). Prior to 2014, many CSOs—particularly those engaged in human rights work—registered as not-for-profit companies or law firms in order to avoid Egypt’s notoriously restrictive Law 84 of 2002 on Non-Governmental Organizations (the “NGO Law”). But in late 2014, the government issued an ultimatum requiring all organizations engaged in civic work to register under the NGO Law, which among other things requires prior government approval before receiving foreign funding. Many CSOs that attempted to register under the law were denied legal status or the government failed to respond to their registration requests. The government also approved amendments to the Penal Code that imposed extremely harsh penalties related to foreign funding received for any purpose deemed harmful to the national interest. The registration order and Penal Code amendment prompted many CSOs to reduce their activities. CSOs were the target of government harassment as well. CSO leaders and staff were interrogated, subjected to travel bans, and prevented from carrying out events. International organizations engaged in work related to political or human rights felt particularly targeted, and at least two international NGOs opted to leave Egypt altogether.

In Jordan, more organizations than in prior years were denied legal registration, often because their goals were deemed too vague, incompatible with local culture, or as having a particular political, religious, or cultural
agenda. The government dissolved increasing numbers of CSOs as well: 108 in 2014 and 189 in 2015, up from sixty-two in 2013. Citing security concerns, including local radicalization and foreign militants, the government amended the counterterrorism law in 2015, expanding the definition of “terrorist act” with sweeping language targeting online expression. For instance, a CSO that posted something on Twitter suggesting support for a group that “promotes terrorist ideas” could itself be held liable for the commission of a terrorist act. The Jordanian government also tightened restrictions on foreign funding, which under the law already required prior government approval; in 2015, the Ministry of Social Development introduced a lengthy, detailed application form, which required CSOs to divulge extensive information about their founders, projects, and activities in order to gain approval to receive foreign funds.

CSOs in the Palestinian territories also experienced tighter legal and administrative regulation of their operations in 2014 and 2015. The Palestinian Authority (PA) government in West Bank introduced new regulations for CSOs in 2014, among other things requiring CSOs to regularly submit additional administrative and financial documents. In 2015, the PA decreed that an anti-corruption law which formerly focused on public officials would be applied to CSOs as well, creating additional administrative burdens. In Gaza, where CSOs are governed by both the PA Ministry of Interior as well as its Hamas counterpart, eighty-seven organizations were dissolved by the government for failure to comply with the PA’s new regulations.

Authorities in Morocco likewise cited security and terrorism concerns when imposing on CSOs administrative burdens not authorized by the CSO law, such as requests for additional documentation during the registration process.

**DEMONSTRATING ADAPTABILITY AND RESILIENCE**

Despite challenging operating environments, CSOs in the region proved to be adaptable, adjusting to circumstances and shifting their activities to address the most pressing needs of their constituents as well as evolving donor agendas. This was most pronounced in those countries facing humanitarian crises, whether due to large refugee or IDP populations, or to armed conflict. In a number of countries, CSOs developed their networks, built new coalitions, and used innovative means of sharing information and knowledge across the sector to work together in adversity.

In Lebanon, which hosted an estimated 1.3 million Syrian refugees by early 2015, foreign donors continued to direct the majority of funds for CSOs to humanitarian aid and social needs, such as community integration and awareness-building programs. Many CSOs were able to build on their existing capacities to address the refugee crisis, providing services such as medical assistance, education services, food, and other essentials.

Likewise in Jordan, CSOs gained greater expertise in aid provision to serve the growing numbers of refugees from Syria and Iraq. In 2014 and 2015, CSOs increasingly specialized in providing relief services, especially in northern governorates most affected by the crisis.

CSOs in Yemen proved resilient as well in the face of no functional government for much of 2014 and 2015, arbitrary harassment and closure by the Houthis, and bombardment by international airstrikes. In places where government institutions had stopped functioning, informal, grassroots organizations provided needed services to local communities. Many international donors reallocated funding, prioritizing emergency humanitarian aid over development assistance, particularly after coalition strikes began in 2015. CSOs likewise redirected their activities to address relief efforts, for instance delivering food, water, medical supplies, and other necessities to those in need. CSOs also cultivated stronger networks and alliances, which helped them exchange information, access funding, and coordinate advocacy efforts with other organizations.

After the 2014 war in Gaza, donor funds increased substantially for Palestinian CSOs to help respond to the urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. Many Palestinian CSOs shifted their logistical and financial resources to prioritize the provision of emergency relief, for instance medical care, sanitation, and food assistance.
Similarly, in Iraq, where donor funding tended primarily to support crisis response and relief efforts, CSOs increasingly focused on providing services for IDPs. Shifting activities to focus on humanitarian relief required organizations to operate flexibly in crisis situations. Organizations faced extreme logistical and security challenges to implement projects in and around areas under Islamic State control; yet they navigated such threats in part by sharing information across the sector. CSO coalitions developed new online forums to communicate with one another and share knowledge about events on the ground.

**FOSTERING GREATER RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT FROM THE PUBLIC**

In nearly every country covered in this Index, CSOs enjoyed an improved public image and growing support from the public in 2014 and 2015. In many cases this was due to CSOs’ responsiveness to local needs and greater visibility thanks to increased media coverage. In some cases, financial support to CSOs from local individuals and private entities also increased, as government funding dried up due to economic shortages.

In Lebanon, the public grew increasingly knowledgeable about and positive towards CSOs in both 2014 and 2015. CSOs formed stronger alliances with local communities, as they not only undertook activities to address the refugee crisis, but also provided services to address other local needs. Many typically state-run services declined as the political situation stagnated, and in some cases CSOs shifted their efforts to fill needed gaps in areas such as health care and education. CSOs received more positive and expansive media coverage as well. CSOs participated in, and in some cases helped lead, the massive “You Stink” protests against the government’s inability to provide garbage removal services in 2015. They also received more extensive and positive media coverage, for You Stink as well as other advocacy activities, including the campaign for a new domestic violence law.

CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza reported improvements in their public image in both 2014 and 2015, as well. CSOs were generally welcomed for their role in responding to the aftermath of the Gaza War. CSOs were also widely recognized for their continued role providing services to communities in a diverse range of fields, from delivering basic goods to providing legal aid and education services. In 2014 and 2015, CSOs also expanded existing coalitions and formed new ones in order to strengthen the sector through greater cooperation, and to be more responsive to citizens’ needs. Such efforts reinforced the public’s positive perception of CSOs.

In Yemen, CSOs also gained greater public support and trust, particularly in 2015, as a result of their active engagement in relief work to aid communities affected by war. In addition, CSOs took the lead in providing basic services to fill gaps left by the government, especially in small towns and villages. Provision of emergency aid and other services to local communities in need helped CSOs to expand their grassroots constituencies. CSOs’ youth initiatives also increased, both in number and in impact, raising hope for greater engagement and support for CSOs from future generations.

Similarly, Iraqi CSOs boosted their public image through greater responsiveness to local needs. CSOs in Iraq focused on primarily local issues in their advocacy campaigns, such as political decentralization, public distribution of oil revenues, and local environmental issues, which boosted their visibility and support among local communities. Iraqi CSOs received more financial support from local sources than in previous years as well, particularly charitable contributions directed to organizations involved in refugee and IDP aid.

In both Jordan and Morocco, CSOs reported more extensive media coverage of their activities and advocacy efforts. CSOs in Jordan received increased and more positive media coverage from government and private media, which helped to inform society about the value of CSOs’ contributions. At the same time, Jordanian CSOs reported increased financial support from local sources in the form of charitable donations. Moroccan media likewise played a positive role in educating the public about CSOs and publicizing their activities. Prominent advocacy campaigns by Moroccan CSOs on social issues such as gender-based violence and abortion rights also helped foster greater public appreciation of CSOs.
Even in Egypt, where CSOs have historically struggled with public skepticism and media smear campaigns (often government-sponsored), CSOs reported some improvements both in how they were portrayed by the media and perceived by the public, as negative characterizations seemed to decrease. Development and service-oriented CSOs were most consistently viewed positively by the public, and in 2014 and 2015 CSOs continued to play a critical role in service provision, particularly to underserved areas where the poorest communities reside.

**TRENDS IN SUSTAINABILITY**

While making progress in some areas, CSO sustainability in the Middle East and North Africa overall continued to be challenged in 2014 and 2015. All scores—for individual dimensions as well as overall sustainability levels—in all countries remained in the Sustainability Evolving and Sustainability Impeded categories. No scores in the region were in the Sustainability Enhanced category.

The CSO sectors in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories continued to record the highest levels of overall sustainability in 2014 and 2015. While CSOs in Lebanon operated in an unstable environment in 2014 and 2015, they continued to benefit from the most enabling legal environment in the region, actively engage in advocacy (although this did not always result in tangible success), and provide services in a range of fields. CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza continued to record high overall levels of sustainability as well, led by particularly strong scores in service provision.

Egypt’s overall CSO sustainability, which remained stable in 2014 and declined in 2015, continued to be the lowest in the region in both years, falling within the Sustainability Impeded category. The Egyptian CSO sector operates within the most constricting legal environment of the seven countries studied—an environment that worsened in both 2014 and 2015 as the government introduced harsh new restrictions. Egyptian CSOs also grapple with weak financial viability and a negative public image, as well as limited advocacy capacity. CSO sustainability in Yemen also continued to fall within the Sustainability Impeded category in both 2014 and 2015. Yemeni CSOs struggle with weak organizational capacity and face particular difficulty remaining financially viable. Jordan’s overall CSO sustainability declined in 2015, moving it back down to Sustainability Impeded after two years in Sustainability Evolving. The decline was largely the result of a deteriorating legal environment as the government tightened its control over the sector.

Overall, sustainability in Iraq and Morocco fell somewhere in the middle. In both countries, CSO sustainability improved from 2013 to 2014 and remained constant in 2015. In Iraq, CSOs increasingly worked with displaced populations, which helped improve the sector’s public image, relationship with the government, and organizational capacities. CSOs in Morocco reported improvements in nearly every dimension of sustainability.

Financial viability, particularly the lack of funding diversification, is a key challenge facing CSOs across the region, and on average, financial viability remained the weakest dimension for the region’s CSOs in both 2014 and 2015. Except for Iraq and Jordan, CSO sectors’ financial viability either stayed the same or worsened in every country. CSOs cited local economic weakness and shifts in international donor priorities as primary causes of financial shortfalls. These shifts benefitted CSOs in Iraq and Jordan, however, as international and local funding to CSOs increased, especially in support of CSOs working in humanitarian aid and charity work to address the refugee and IDP crises.

In contrast, CSOs in the region are relatively strong in their ability to provide services to and advocate for the needs of their constituent communities; overall, service provision and advocacy were the strongest dimensions of CSO sustainability in the region in 2014 and 2015. Service provision improved steadily during both years in Lebanon and Yemen and improved in 2014 in Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and the West Bank and Gaza, although in 2015 it slipped back down to 2013 levels in Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza. In Lebanon, CSOs provided increasingly diverse services as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis, in addition to responding to perceived shortfalls in traditionally state-provided services, such as health care and education. CSOs in Yemen likewise
increasingly provided basic goods and services to respond to the growing humanitarian crisis, for instance taking
the lead in providing potable water to residents in Taiz and emergency medical relief in Aden.

Advocacy also improved in many countries in the region, including Iraq (2015), Lebanon (2014 and 2015),
Morocco (2014), and Yemen (2014). In Iraq, CSOs engaged in numerous issue-based advocacy campaigns and
reported increasingly positive, cooperative relationships with government authorities, particularly in Kurdistan.
CSOs advocated for the passage of a new Money Laundering Law, Labor Law, and Political Parties Law, all of
which were adopted in 2015. CSOs in Morocco launched awareness and advocacy campaigns targeting issues
such as the cost of living, gender-based violence, and abortion. Prior to the Houthi takeover in late 2014,
advocacy increased in Yemen as a result of the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), which among other
things provided for a stronger government-CSO partnership. Yemeni CSOs formed new coalitions to advocate
on issues such as women’s political participation and enjoyed stronger relationships with government decision
makers during 2014 as well. As the Houthis imposed new restrictions on most types of activism, CSOs focused
their advocacy in 2015 on less contentious issues, such as supporting the government in its efforts to provide
basic services.

Egypt was a striking exception to the general improvement in advocacy in the region. CSOs in Egypt faced an
increasingly constrained environment for advocacy with the introduction of new restrictive measures. These
included in 2015 harsh counterterrorism legislation with broad definitions that could be used to bar peaceful
political advocacy and other means of legitimate expression. The government also declined to withdraw or
amend a restrictive law on public demonstrations that served as the basis for imprisoning many rights advocates.

Most MENA countries reported positive improvements in several dimensions of CSO sustainability in 2014
and 2015. While organizational capacity continues to be limited, four countries reported that the organizational
capacity of CSOs improved in 2014: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen. The positive trend continued into
2015, as the capacity of CSOs in all seven countries either improved or stayed the same. CSOs in nearly all
countries reported progress in areas such as building local constituencies, engaging in strategic planning, and
operating under stronger and more transparent management systems.

Perhaps even more striking in a region where CSOs have struggled to establish strong ties within their
communities, the public image of CSOs improved dramatically across the region in 2014 and 2015, as described
in greater detail above. In every country, CSOs reported more positive relationships with the public, media,
government, and the private sector. In places such as Iraq, CSOs pointed to their greater visibility in providing
aid to IDPs and refugees as a reason for enhanced public trust and respect. Even in Egypt, where CSOs were
the targets of media smear campaigns in recent years, negative publicity decreased, and CSOs enjoyed enhanced
engagement with the private sector and leveraged social media skills to build public awareness of their activities
and contributions to society.

The infrastructure for CSOs in the region also improved during the two years, particularly in 2014. CSOs in
every country except for Egypt reported having greater access to resources, such as training, technical assistance
organizations, expanded coalitions, and information-sharing networks. In Lebanon, which had the strongest
infrastructure score in the region, CSOs expanded existing coalitions and formed new ones to coordinate efforts
in areas such as women’s rights and electoral reform; CSOs also increasingly formed partnerships with
government and private sector entities. In the West Bank and Gaza, which had the second strongest
infrastructure score, CSOs reported greater satisfaction with their access to training as well as the creation of
large CSO coalitions and strong partnerships outside the sector, particularly with universities.

Despite signs of progress, the legal environment for CSOs significantly deteriorated or remained the same for
CSOs in all countries except for Morocco in 2014 and 2015. In particular, the legal environments in which
CSOs operate deteriorated in Egypt and Jordan. As described in more detail above, governments in both
countries denied legal registration to CSOs, dissolved CSOs, and restricted their access to foreign funds.
CONCLUSION

As described in detail in the country and territory reports, 2014 and 2015 presented a complicated picture of CSO sustainability across the Middle East and North Africa. There were some remarkable signs of progress, especially in the face of stark humanitarian and security crises, as CSOs proved resilient in the face of challenging operating environments, adapting and expanding their ability to provide services. CSOs in every country also reported stronger links to their local communities and a more positive public perception of their role.

Nonetheless, governments in several countries – most notably Egypt, but also Jordan and the Palestinian territories – imposed new legal and administrative restrictions that hindered CSOs’ abilities to achieve their potential. Political stagnation or instability in other countries, such as Lebanon and Yemen, limited CSOs’ ability to effect meaningful change. CSOs across the region remained financially vulnerable, lacking sustained support from local government and private sector sources and often primarily reliant on international donors with fluctuating priorities.

The country and territory reports that follow provide an in-depth look at the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza. We hope the Index captures useful trends for CSOs, governments, donors, and researchers supporting the advancement of CSO sectors.
## 2014/2015 CSO Sustainability Ratings

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<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
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<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
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Egypt reached important political benchmarks in 2014 and 2015, beginning with the public approval of a new constitution in January 2014, and concluding with elections for Egypt’s new House of Representatives in the final months of 2015. In the absence of a legislature during this period, interim President Adly Mansour and then President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi held legislative as well as executive power, and...
together issued over 350 laws by decree. According to CSOs and other observers, many of these laws contradicted articles of the new constitution, including provisions protecting individual rights and freedoms. Civil society in Egypt was subject to intense restrictions during 2014 and 2015. The government continued its restrictive approach to groups and individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was outlawed in 2013, dissolving organizations and freezing the funds of suspected affiliates. Particularly after the election of President Sisi in June 2014, the government took additional steps to quell dissent and political opposition, including against those not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Freedom of expression suffered along with freedom of association, and in 2015 Egypt ranked second in the world for the number of journalists detained. Enforcement of the restrictive 2013 Protest Law continued as well, and authorities imprisoned thousands of individuals for unsanctioned public assemblies.

According to Egypt’s Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS), in December 2015 there were 45,000 NGOs registered under the country’s NGO law, Law 84 of 2002, 10,201 of which were active. This report will also discuss CSOs that take organizational forms other than NGOs in order to avoid having to register under the restrictive Law 84; instead they register as civil companies, law firms, and independent trade unions, which engage in civic and public interest activities (including, for instance, human rights work), but for which registration under Law 84 is not required.

Given the generally more restrictive environment for CSOs, overall CSO sustainability as measured by the CSO Sustainability Index declined somewhat between 2014 and 2015.


The new constitution adopted in 2014 contains enabling provisions related to freedom of association. Articles 75 and 76 grant citizens the absolute right to form associations, foundations, syndicates, and trade unions upon notification. The articles guarantee the independence of these entities and limit their dissolution to judicial action. Nonetheless, the legal environment for civil society consistently declined in 2014 and 2015. This period was marked by increased manipulation of the law to restrict NGOs, federations, and independent trade unions, constraining their operations and undermining their autonomy. The security apparatus also played a more pronounced role in interfering with NGOs. For instance, twice in October 2015, security authorities cancelled a planned meeting between the Egyptian Center for Public Policy Studies (ECPPS) and a number of parliamentary candidates. The meeting was intended to discuss freedom of association in light of the new constitution and international standards. On both occasions, staff at the meeting venue reported receiving orders from security officials to cancel the meeting.

The restrictive Law 84 continues to govern NGOs, giving the MoSS extensive powers over these organizations. In an act perceived as part of a broader crackdown on CSOs, the Ministry published a notice in Al-Ahram newspaper in July 2014 requiring all civic entities that practice “civic work”\(^2\) that were not registered under Law 84 to do so. It set a forty-five day deadline for new registrations (later extended to November 10, 2014), indicating that entities which failed to register would face legal repercussions. Ultimately, the government did

\(^2\) “Civic work” is a translation of the term used in the official notice from MoSS.
not follow through with a widespread crackdown on unregistered organizations. However, the registration order served as a warning to unregistered CSOs as well as some of those registered under other legal forms, such as civil companies or law firms. According to the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), several such organizations reduced staff, activities and advocacy in order to avoid government reprisals.

For those local CSOs that did attempt to register under Law 84, the outcome often appeared arbitrary, and in 2014 and 2015 a number of organizations were denied legal status after attempting to register. The MoSS denied the registration of, among others, the Foundation of the Victims of Abduction and Forced Disappearance, El Abour Community Development Association, and Tiba Community Development Association. In other instances, the MoSS failed to respond to registration requests, as was the case with the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Foundation of the Egyptian Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

In the case of international groups, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declined registration requests from several international organizations, including the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, Good Neighbors, and Counterpart International. In attempting to register, international NGOs often faced confusing administrative and procedural obstacles, and a lack of clarity as to the cognizant government counterpart. These obstacles include contradictory or confusing requirements. For example, in one instance an organization was given written instructions requiring it to have staff and a physical presence in the country prior to registration, while in another, that same organization was given oral instructions to ignore the written letter. The reasons for these differing instructions were unclear. The government ultimately refused registration and demanded those groups cease operations in the country. At the same time, the MoSS claimed that sixteen foreign organizations were registered or re-registered in the first half of 2015, among them Management Sciences for Health (MSH), Enactus, and SAMU Social.

The government dissolved an unprecedented number of local NGOs in both 2014 and 2015, most on grounds of a suspected association with the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the MoSS, during 2014 and 2015 it “banned” 1,074 NGOs with alleged links to the Muslim Brotherhood; of these, 553 were dissolved, and the other 521 were put under supervision of a special committee entrusted with managing Muslim Brotherhood funds. The MoSS dissolved an additional 872 NGOs during this period for reasons other than alleged Muslim Brotherhood ties, including inactivity of the organization, and disbanded the boards of directors of 224 NGOs.

Another major legal development that threatened CSOs’ sustainability came in the form of a Penal Code amendment in September 2014 that imposed harsh new penalties on the receipt of foreign funds to undermine national security. The amended Article 78 punishes—with life imprisonment and a large fine—anyone who receives funding or other support from a foreign source with the intent to “harm the national interest,” “compromise national sovereignty,” or “breach security or public peace.” Civil servants who facilitate the improper receipt of foreign funding are now subject to the death penalty. This vague language gives prosecutors broad discretion in their application of the law. The discretionary language and severe penalties led many Egyptian CSOs supported by donors to fear that the law would be used against them for carrying out legitimate, peaceful activities that the government did not approve. Given the overall environment and the registration order, some foreign-funded organizations involved in human rights or other controversial topics reduced their activities in order to avoid becoming government targets. CIHRS, for example, decided in December 2014 to move its international programs to Tunisia, after more than two decades of basing such programs in Egypt.

Government harassment and other coercive actions against NGOs persisted in 2014 and 2015. In May 2014, security forces raided the Alexandria branch of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR). In May 2015, a lawyer and two judges who had been working with United Group (a law firm specializing in human rights cases) were interrogated in connection with their development of an anti-torture bill which was forwarded to the Presidency. Egyptian authorities also banned a number of civil society activists from leaving the country and confiscated their passports. For example, in June 2015, the Executive Director of the Egyptian Delegation for Rights and Freedoms was detained at the airport and denied travel to Germany to attend a
roundtable discussion. In October 2015, security authorities barred Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies from sending trainees to Jordan to participate in a training program. These incidents had a major impact on human rights groups in particular, leading some groups to reduce activities and limit advocacy.

Authorities took legal action against independent trade unions, as well. 2014 and 2015 witnessed a continued struggle between the state-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) and independent unions. The head of ETUF launched a public smear campaign against members of the independent unions, and called for the unions’ dissolution. In late 2015, the Cabinet issued a notice to all governmental entities, instructing them not to deal with the independent unions but to cooperate with ETUF exclusively. Independent unions and specialized federations considered this a major affront and encroachment on the rights of Egyptian workers.

The legal basis guiding the taxation and earned income of CSOs, including NGOs, has not changed since 2013. Under the law, CSOs do not pay taxes on funds and grants from abroad or on imported materials that are required for their activities, such as office equipment. They must use such materials for their activities, and may not sell them without prior approval from the MoSS. CSOs also do not have to pay taxes on contracts, powers of attorney, publications, or records. CSOs may earn income from the provision of goods and services, however CSOs that are registered under legal forms such as civil companies and law firms are subject to a tax ranging from 20 to 25 percent on any profits. NGOs registered under Law 84 are not subject to this tax. Additionally, corporations and individuals receive tax benefits for donations to NGOs; the amount deducted should not exceed 10 percent of the donor’s net annual income.

The Regional Federations of NGOs, which are present in both urban and rural areas, provide legal assistance to NGOs. There is also a core group of lawyers who have received specific training in the area of NGO law, and are able to provide assistance to NGOs, if needed. More than 150 lawyers in fifteen governorates, for instance, participated in training programs held by United Group in 2013 focused both on the legal environment for NGOs as well as internal NGO governance. During 2014 and 2015, many of these lawyers worked directly with the Regional Federation of NGOs in their governorates.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 5.4 / 2015: 5.4**

The sector's organizational capacity continued to be relatively weak in 2014 and 2015. The organizational capacity of CSOs generally corresponds to the size of the organization and nature of its activities. Larger organizations engaged in service provision and/or philanthropy, for instance, have greater capacities and are more effective at building strong local constituencies. Among the leading organizations demonstrating strong capacities are the Egyptian Food Bank, the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS), and CARE/Egypt.

Strategic planning continues to pose a major challenge for most CSOs. Again, larger CSOs are more likely to have well-defined visions, missions, and strategic plans, though the extent to which they adhere to them varies. Smaller and medium-sized organizations, which represent approximately 80 percent of CSOs, often struggle to formulate these tools at all. Law 84 may contribute somewhat to many NGOs’ lack of vision and mission by encouraging them to register with a set of unrelated purposes. Many NGOs seeking to register under Law 84, believing that diversification of purposes could enhance their chances of securing registration, put forward a number of areas of interest rather than clear and well-defined visions or mission statements. Given that NGOs under Law 84 must receive project-level approvals even when they have some form of planning in place, the unpredictability of funding in addition to changes in donors’ priorities often make such plans obsolete.
Most CSOs struggle with democratic internal governance regardless of whether they have developed governing structures. CSOs’ boards of directors and general assemblies rarely participate extensively in governance or determining organizational plans and policies. Instead, the chairperson of the board, without much oversight or accountability, often takes the lead in running the organization. This is especially true for small and medium-sized organizations. Few CSOs have institutionalized themselves as true, democratic organizations whose base extends beyond the personal leadership of their founders or a small cadre of board members.

Except for the few large organizations, CSOs are often unable to acquire well-trained professional staff, mainly due to financial constraints. CSOs’ ability to mobilize volunteers has suffered in the context of grim economic conditions; however, religious influence continues to play a role in generating volunteerism, particularly in rural areas. For example, activities conducted by Life Makers, a faith-oriented philanthropic developmental organization, attracted more than 63,000 volunteers in 2013 and 2014.

Organizations’ access to modernized office infrastructure is also tied to the size of the organization. The few large organizations are generally well-equipped. Smaller CSOs, particularly donor-funded organizations, were better equipped in 2014 and 2015 than in earlier years, though their ability to maintain and update their equipment remains limited. Still, even very small, non-donor funded organizations usually have computers, cell phones, and Internet access. The relatively affordable costs of such equipment, in addition to the proliferation of affordable Internet access and social media platforms, have allowed many CSOs to publicize their activities online.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 2014: 5.6 / 2015: 5.7**

CSOs’ financial viability remained tenuous in 2014 and worsened somewhat in 2015.

The government imposed new barriers on foreign funding for CSOs in 2014 and 2015. Under Law 84, registered NGOs have always had to obtain prior approval from the MoSS before they could receive funds from outside Egypt, which in turn required clearance by security authorities. Beginning in late 2014, the prior approval requirement was expanded to all CSOs, including civil companies and law firms engaged in “civic work,” which were required to change their status and comply with Law 84 following the MoSS’s registration notice. Approval of funding is irregular and difficult to predict. While some observers feel that organizations that conduct charity work are more likely to receive approval than CSOs working on human rights and political reform, there are exceptions that test this assumption.

In September 2014, as described above, penalties for the receipt of foreign funding deemed intended to “harm the national interest,” “compromise national sovereignty,” or “breach security or public peace” were intensified with amendments to Penal Code Article 78. Under the amended Article, receiving financial or other support from a foreign source with such intent became punishable by life imprisonment and a large fine, while civil servants who facilitate the improper receipt of foreign funding are now subject to the death penalty. This tended to either discourage CSOs from relying on foreign donors to support their activities, or encourage those that continued to receive funds to reduce their advocacy and avoid controversial topics.

On June 25, 2015, CSOs reported that the government of Egypt had issued a memorandum instructing them not to deal with the U.S. State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), a frequent funder of CSO projects in Egypt, whether this involved engaging in joint programs or participation in MEPI-sponsored activities. In September 2015, the MoSS rejected outright a request submitted by the Arab Council Supporting Fair Trials and Human Rights to receive funds from the U.S.-based National Endowment for Democracy. The funds were intended to support a training for Egyptian lawyers and judges on international human rights
conventions.

Despite these restrictions, the MoSS publicized its approval of large amounts of NGO funding, announcing that from July 1 to September 14, 2014, it approved 100,630,613 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $12.9 million) provided by seventy donors and benefiting sixty-four registered NGOs. In the first half of 2015, according to the MoSS, it approved funding requests in the amount of 259,637,113 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $33.2 million), provided by 288 donors and benefitting 179 NGOs. NGOs that were able to secure government approval for funding were primarily engaged in development and charitable activities. Some of these NGOs are affiliated with large foundations or businessmen who enjoy the trust of the government. For example, Om Habiba Foundation, which is associated with the Agha Khan Foundation, received a foreign grant in the amount of 17,875,000 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $2.3 million), while Misr El Khair Foundation received a grant in the amount of 11,158,000 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $1.4 million).

In general, organizations engaged in charitable activities have the greatest access to domestic funding. Religiously-motivated giving, such as zakat and sadaqa in Islam, is deeply engrained in Egyptian culture and comprises a significant source of funding for charitable CSOs. For example, Al Jam’aiyya El Shar’iaa, which provides a range of services from religious education to water and sanitation and has more than 1,000 branches nationwide, reported having a 2015 budget financed primarily by zakat and sadaqa. Other large organizations that provide charitable services, relief efforts, and other development-oriented activities are also able to raise substantial domestic funds. Such organizations include the Egyptian Food Bank, Misr El Khair Foundation, El Orman Association, Resalam, and CEOSS.

Multi-national corporations are the leaders in corporate philanthropy for CSOs, and Egyptian corporations increasingly follow suit. Some large, local corporations institutionalize their philanthropy initiatives by establishing grant-making foundations with a focus on development. For example, the Etisalat telecommunications company created the grant-making Ayaadi Etisalat Foundation. Smaller local companies are less oriented towards development philanthropy, and tend to focus on individual charitable causes.

CSOs are not able to rely on cost recovery from the services they provide, as they primarily serve the poor, and therefore charge only nominal fees, if any. Further, CSOs generally suffer from weak connections to their membership base, and are not able to rely on members to provide significant revenues. Even large organizations struggle to secure members’ commitment to pay membership fees, let alone donate for activities. Instead, many organizations depend on funding either from a single member, who then has disproportionate control over strategic decisions, or from foreign funding sources.

Government ministries and institutions also provide some funds directly to CSOs, particularly NGOs that deliver charitable services. For example, in two initiatives – Children Without Shelter and Our Future is in Our Hands – the MoSS partnered with twenty-one NGOs, providing them with $1.4 million in funding from the Ministry’s NGO Support Fund. The Children Without Shelter project, launched in late 2014, focuses on rehabilitating and reintegrating homeless children. The Our Future is in Our Hands initiative, begun in 2015, focuses on youth empowerment and increasing young peoples’ civic and political participation. The Ministry of Environment also provides funding to NGOs to carry out activities by posting a public tender either on its website, in a newspaper, and/or through their local level directorates, with criteria for application. In addition, according to Law 84 some organizations can be designated Public Interest Organizations, which the government may contract to carry out activities. For example, in June 2015, the MoSS agreed to grant funding for seventeen projects by such organizations engaged in youth empowerment, totaling roughly six million Egyptian Pounds (approximately $680,000).

CSOs do not consistently practice transparent financial management. Article 21 of Law 84 requires NGOs to maintain financial records and to employ auditors if their budgets exceed 20,000 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $2,500). Complying with these requirements proves difficult for many organizations, however, due to financial constraints. Accordingly, it is common for NGOs to seek assistance from the MoSS staff to help balance their books, a practice that opens the door for conflict of interest and corruption. In general, CSOs
do not systematically publish annual financial or activity reports. Only a limited number do so routinely and publish their reports on their websites.

**ADVOCACY: 2014: 5.4 / 2015: 5.5**

The environment for CSO advocacy became increasingly constrained in 2014 and 2015, diminishing advocacy efforts as a result. In both years, government authorities took restrictive measures that discouraged advocacy, and public statements by officials reinforced the message that the government would not welcome dissenting views from CSOs. For instance, a number of CSO members who are prominent and vocal rights activists were subjected to official travel bans in 2014 and 2015 and could not leave Egypt. In 2014, the government also declined to withdraw or amend a restrictive law on demonstrations and protests which continued to serve as grounds for imprisoning many rights advocates. In a practical sense, the absence of a legislative body in Egypt during 2014 and 2015 further contributed to a decline in CSO advocacy, as there were fewer opportunities for direct engagement with decision makers.

In early 2015, the government adopted sweeping counterterrorism legislation that contained potential constraints on expression and advocacy. For instance, drawing on a broad definition of “terrorist acts,” Article 35 of the law provides that anyone who publishes or promotes stories about terrorist acts or news that contradicts official statements of the Defense Ministry may be punished by a fine of 200,000-500,000 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $25,000-$64,000). If the person publishes the story as part of their occupation, a court can bar them from practicing their profession for up to a year. The law also punishes anyone who uses a website for the purpose of “promoting ideas or beliefs advocating the commission of terrorist acts” with at least five years in prison.

On May 21, 2015, an investigating judge subjected staff members of the United Group to a lengthy interrogation in connection with its work developing an anti-torture draft bill and advocating for its adoption. These legal proceedings reinforce the message that the government does not welcome attempts at advocacy and legal reform that challenge the government’s position.

There are generally no established or systematic mechanisms for CSOs to participate in government decision-making. Some government entities, including the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, the National Council for Women, and the Ministry of Environment, engage in regular consultation with CSOs. CSO access and ability to advocate to different decision-making bodies varies widely depending on the institution involved, however.

There were isolated instances of issue-based advocacy coalitions among CSOs during 2014 and 2015. On August 21, 2015, twenty independent professional syndicates formed a coordinating body called Tadamoun. The body called for a protest in September 2015 to denounce the new Civil Service Law and called for its suspension, challenging the Law on the grounds that it was issued via presidential decree prior to the seating of the parliament, without consulting relevant stakeholders, and that its new system of salaries, hiring, and dismissal would not favor employees and would increase corruption and nepotism. In addition, in December 2015, fifty independent trade unions and federations announced their establishment of a Coordinating Committee for Independent Trade Unions to advocate for democratic trade unions laws and to expose corruption within the ETUF. During parliamentary elections, which were organized between October and December 2015, a number of individual organizations, as well as the Egyptian Coalition for Election Observation, engaged in election observation. A number of rights-focused organizations also partnered with the Freedom Committee of the Press Syndicate to mark International Human Rights Day on December 10,
2015, a widely-attended event that included discussions of human rights issues and recommendations to address the situation.

At the local level, CSO advocacy is more limited. Smaller, local organizations, when they do engage in advocacy, usually do so as part of a coalition, often led by larger NGOs or in partnership with other local groups in their subject area.

CSOs have remained engaged on the issue of enabling legal reforms to support civil society, and their advocacy in 2014 and 2015 helped prevent additional restrictions. The draft NGO law that CSOs helped to develop in 2013 under the leadership of then-Minister of Social Solidarity Dr. Ahmed El Borei was withdrawn when Dr. Ghada Wali assumed the position of Minister in 2014. Minister Wali directed a committee within the MoSS to develop a different draft NGO law, which contained numerous new constraints on NGOs and was even more restrictive than Law 84. NGOs objected to the MoSS’s new draft, and issued numerous documents to raise awareness about the draft locally and among the international community. In addition, on September 18, 2014, eleven Regional Federations of NGOs and 150 NGOs and CSOs from fourteen governorates participated in a conference to discuss the draft law. The government ultimately withdrew the Ministry’s draft and postponed consideration of the issue until after parliamentary elections.


Service provision by CSOs remained relatively stable during 2014 and 2015. CSOs continue to play a critical role in providing services to Egypt’s population, particularly in underserved urban and rural areas where the least advantaged communities reside. These services range from basic services (such as potable water, supplemental meals, and health services) to more advanced assistance (including small loans, job training, education, rehabilitation, and women’s empowerment). Large, faith-based NGOs with numerous local branches across the country provide the bulk of charitable services. Smaller, Community Development Associations (CDAs), which are present in nearly all villages, provide services as well, however these are often of lower quality and frequency. According to Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMUS), 2,995 NGOs provided services to some 2,262,350 individuals throughout Egypt in 2014. Of these beneficiaries, 42 percent received orphan and senior citizens services, 37 percent received services targeting people with disabilities, 22 percent received welfare services, and 8 percent received family planning services.

In 2014, the Egyptian Food Bank delivered some 21,000 meals to students in ten governorates, in addition to providing monthly food staples to 240,000 families. In 2014 and 2015, CARE/Egypt reached 36,000 citizens in the governorates of Sohag and Assuit, raising their awareness about women’s inheritance rights. Some medium-sized NGOs are also able to reach large numbers of beneficiaries. In the area of human rights, for instance, the Egyptian Center for Women Rights worked with local partners to train approximately 300,000 women in twenty-seven governorates under a project titled Women Voices for Combatting Violence Against Women. In 2015, Caritas Egypt, in collaboration with the Rainbow Foundation for Development, held a camp for 115 children and their mothers in the Rod El Farag neighborhood to develop family participation in community building.

CSOs primarily rely on community knowledge to identify the needs and priorities of the populations they serve. It is rare for CSOs to carry out rigorous assessments or surveys prior to providing services, unless they are part of a donor-funded project. The range of services that CSOs provide target recipients beyond CSOs’ own memberships, and often comprise the public at large. CSOs also provide services to other CSOs, government bodies, and academia, for instance by providing them with publications and inviting them to CSO-led
workshops.

Most CSOs provide their services at a nominal fee or free of charge, as they primarily cater to the poor and are aware of the financial constraints affecting their beneficiaries.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 2014: 4.2 / 2015: 4.2**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector declined substantially in 2014, primarily due to funding shortages and the introduction of new government restrictions, both of which decreased the availability of capacity-building support. The situation remained relatively unchanged in 2015.

There are very few intermediary support or resource organizations that are primarily dedicated to supporting civil society. These few entities include the Egyptian NGO Service Center and the Center for Development Services (CDS). In theory, the various federations of NGOs also provide some support, however their minimal budgets do not allow for the provision of meaningful assistance. Some CSOs provide support to other organizations, as well, usually through specific donor-funded projects. For example, in 2014 and 2015, United Group provided specialized training and technical assistance to 100 organizations in the area of monitoring, documenting, raising awareness, and providing legal assistance related to cases of torture.

Some for-profit, private sector entities have established foundations that provide CSOs with capacity building and funding in the context of fulfilling their social responsibilities. Among the leading grant-making organizations are the Sawiris Foundation, Vodafone Egypt for Community Development, and the Mobile Kolena Wahed Foundation. These foundations primarily support development-focused CSOs.

A number of coalitions and networks continued operating during 2014 and 2015. The Forum of Independent Egyptian Human Rights NGOs, one such coalition, submitted a report during Egypt's Universal Periodic Review at the Human Rights Council in November 2014. The Egyptian Coalition on Children’s Rights, composed of sixty-four NGOs working on child rights, continued to be active. In 2014-2015, for instance, the coalition called for the implementation of child-favorable articles in the Constitution; Egypt’s adoption of the Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and fair trials for juveniles. It also issued reports on abuses against children, and in 2015 it announced that the coalition will take the lead in drafting a parallel report to be submitted to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2016.

New coalitions emerged during this rating period, as well. These included the Federation for NGOs Working in the Area of Human Rights and Transitional Justice (January 2014), the Federation for NGOs Working in the Area of Heritage Crafts in North and South Sinai (June 2014), the Federation for Development Pioneers NGOs (February 2014), and the Federation for Nubian NGOs for Social Assistance (October 2015).

Opportunities for CSO training and capacity building in 2014 and 2015 were very limited, particularly as compared to 2012 and 2013. The decline is primarily due to dwindling donor support and diminishing funding available for capacity building. In addition, heightened restrictions have constrained CSO capacity building activities, and authorities have occasionally banned training events. For example, in October 2015, security authorities canceled a gender equality training program organized by the Women Center for Legal Awareness and Guidance. The authorities also barred two British trainers associated with the event from entering the country. CSOs have access to some capacity building and training manuals online; however, it is not clear that these resources are used extensively.
Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and other sectors – including the media, government, and businesses – remain the exception rather than the norm. In a few instances, government agencies do contract CSOs to assist in carrying out objectives. For instance, the MoSS has engaged NGOs to carry out some of its social development goals, such as the Our Future is in Our Hands and Children Without Shelter initiatives, discussed above. The National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, and to a lesser extent, the National Council for Women, have both undertaken limited partnerships with NGOs, for instance to consult on the development of strategies and action plans. On occasion, the private sector partners with civil society as well, including through philanthropic support from corporate foundations, as described above. In 2014 and 2015, the NGO Nahdet El Mahrousa worked with companies to promote sustainable community change through youth skill-building, while CEOSS engaged in partnerships with agribusinesses to improve farmers’ productivity. Meaningful partnerships that go beyond these few examples of engagement are rare.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 2014: 5.7 / 2015: 5.7**

Negative media discourse on CSOs was less prominent in 2014 and 2015, particularly in comparison with the two preceding years. There were notably fewer systematic, government-sponsored media attacks on CSOs. Nonetheless, CSOs generally do not enjoy extensive or positive media coverage and some negative discourse on CSOs continued. CSOs tend not to have established or strategic approaches towards the media, while the media lacks knowledge about the sector.

Media reporting on CSOs varies. For example, consumer protection organizations engaged in price monitoring and market interventions enjoyed broad media coverage. An NGO called Monitoring and Quality for Consumer Protection was one group that received broad and favorable coverage in 2014 and 2015. Additionally, in November and December 2015, human rights organizations working on an anti-torture campaign, including United Group, received exceptionally positive media coverage, potentially an effort to contain mounting public anger over human rights violations in Egypt. That said, media coverage usually reflects a lack of in-depth understanding of civil society and CSO activities.

To date, there are no studies that measure public opinion of civil society in Egypt. Despite occasional individual attacks on human rights groups in public fora, the public continues to seek out CSOs for support, for instance as a last resort for victims of torture. CSOs that provide services tend to enjoy a consistently more positive public opinion, both in terms of the services provided and the manner in which the services are provided. This positive perception, however, is not reflected in public donations to CSOs, nor does it seem to translate into solidarity with CSOs when they come under attack or have their activities banned. Furthermore, public and government perceptions of foreign funding remained negative.

The government’s perception of CSOs remains opaque, but agencies’ and officials’ attitudes seem to be primarily opportunistic, with a positive attitude primarily towards those organizations that help them achieve certain objectives.

As for the private sector, a historical gap in trust between the sector and CSOs appears to have narrowed. A number of businesses now support CSO activities, particularly ones with economic, social, and human development objectives. As discussed above, several large companies have formed foundations, including the Sawiris Foundation, which provide grants for CSOs to implement sustainable and community development projects. The private sector’s positive perception of and partnership with CSOs largely excludes those groups that focus on human rights and political development, however, a distinction that aligns with the state’s position.
In general, CSOs are becoming more effective in their use of social media to publicize activities. Small and medium-sized CSOs usually have Facebook pages to interact with their constituencies and develop their public image. Larger organizations often have their own websites in which they are able to elaborate on the organization and its activities, and to share success stories and publications. Many journalists obtain information from these sites when covering CSOs. Some organizations have formed personal relationships with journalists which facilitate more systematic news coverage. Local media outlets are generally more keen and active in covering local CSOs’ activities in their respective communities.

The development and adoption of a code of ethics for CSOs, an initiative begun soon after the 2011 revolution, has made little progress. This could be attributed to financial and legal pressures on CSOs, which mean that CSOs must direct all time and resources not spent on activities to fundraising and self-preservation. CSO transparency also has not improved. Under Law 84, NGOs must submit annual reports to the MoSS. While it was common in prior decades for NGOs to share detailed activity reports and budgets, organizations are now less willing to publish their reports. Only a select few share their budgets online, and then with only limited details. This may be linked to a fear of negative media coverage, particularly in the case of organizations that receive foreign funding.
Iraq faced multiple political, security, and economic challenges in 2014 and 2015. In 2014, the Islamic State took control of Mosul, as well as parts of Salah ad Din, Anbar, and Diyala provinces in the western and central parts of the country. Islamic State-controlled areas witnessed severe human rights violations, particularly against religious minorities like the Yazidi and Christian communities. The group’s territorial expansion also led to an increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs), as civilians fled areas under Islamic State control. As a result of the security and humanitarian crises, many local and international CSOs shifted their activities to focus on relief and services for IDPs, as well as documenting rights violations by the Islamic State. The increase in CSOs’ work in camps for the displaced helped improve the public image of CSOs, as well as their relationship with the government.

Country Facts

Capital: Baghdad
Government Type: Parliamentary Democracy
Population: 37,056,169 (July 2015 est.)
GDP per capita (PPP): $15,500 (2015 est.)
Human Development Index: 121 (2015)
In April 2014, Iraq held parliamentary elections, which resulted in a contentious albeit relatively peaceful transition of power to a new government led by Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi. Over the course of 2014 and particularly in the third quarter, Iraq experienced a severe economic crisis, largely due to the collapse of global oil prices, since oil revenue is a major component of the national budget. As a result, the government provided less direct financial support to CSOs. On the other hand, the state was generally more open to cooperation with CSOs due to its lack of resources and CSOs’ ability to fill gaps in service provision.

In 2015, growing public discontent – focused on extensive government corruption, poor service delivery, and a weak judiciary – led to widespread public demonstrations. CSOs helped mobilize demonstrations such as those in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in July and weekly Friday protests that took place thereafter. Prime Minister al-Abadi ultimately submitted a package of reforms addressing protestors’ demands, which the parliament approved in August. Meanwhile, following operations begun in the spring, Iraqi military forces liberated some areas from the Islamic State, including Tikrit, Sinjar, and Ramadi. CSOs soon after began conducting activities in the newly liberated areas, such as providing aid to returning civilian populations.

According to Iraq’s federal NGO Directorate there were 2,150 NGOs registered by the end of 2014, which increased to 2,591 in 2015. Kurdistan’s NGO Department reported approximately 2,300 NGOs registered at the end of 2014 and 2,564 NGOs one year later.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 2014: 4.4 / 2015: 4.4**

The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (Law 12 of 2010) remains the primary law governing CSOs in the federal region of Iraq, while CSOs in Kurdistan operate under the Law on Non-Governmental Organizations in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (Kurdistan Regional Government Law 1 of 2011). Both laws are relatively enabling, and each provides for a straightforward registration process with minimal requirements and clear time limits for the government to respond. Overall, the registration process for CSOs became somewhat easier in 2014 and 2015 as CSOs became more familiar with the law. Iraq’s NGO Directorate reports that roughly 95 percent of CSO registration applications are approved.

While relatively minor, some challenges to registration arose during the reporting period. In 2015, Kurdish authorities added an article to the terms of registration requiring applicants to notarize their documents, justifying the change on the need for additional screening and review of applicants for connections to terrorist organizations. The Kurdish Council of Ministers also withdrew the right of foreign colleges and universities to register as CSOs, after foreign universities took advantage of this privilege to avoid the higher fees for foreign university registration.

The government institutions in charge of NGO registration (the NGO Directorate in Iraq’s federal government, and the NGO Department in Kurdistan) are not able to unilaterally dissolve a CSO but may suspend a CSO’s activities for thirty days for violations of the CSO law. The government may also request that a court order the dissolution of a CSO for more serious violations. If a CSO attracts negative government attention, for instance by speaking out against corruption or alleging abuses committed by security forces, it may be more likely to face such challenges or extra bureaucratic obstacles. CSOs are able to join networks; however they must submit required documents to be registered as such.
Government departments are generally cooperative, and administrative harassment of CSOs is rare. Dealing with these departments grew more complicated in 2014 and 2015, however, particularly following the Islamic State’s invasion and takeover of certain areas. Authorities in Kirkuk and Dahuk began exercising more supervision and control over CSOs operating in and around camps for IDPs. Kirkuk officials also require CSOs to obtain a governor’s permission in order to operate. There were increasing administrative obstacles in Maysan and Basrah in 2015 as well. In both places, for instance, work is forbidden without official government approval.

Kurdistan’s Law 1 of 2011 provides that all CSOs are exempt from all taxes and customs duties on their revenue, property, and funds. In contrast, CSOs registered under Iraq’s Law 12 of 2010 are exempt from taxes and customs duties only if they also apply for and are granted “public utility” status. This status is granted by the Council of Ministers to CSOs that are established “to achieve a public interest.” Neither individual nor corporate donors receive tax benefits for donations to CSOs.

CSOs are able to earn income from the government in exchange for services; however, the economic crisis and budget shortfall brought an end to such income in the second half of 2014. CSOs are generally allowed by law to charge fees for the services they provide, but few organizations do so. CSOs that provide legal services are among those which more commonly bring in revenue.

A corps of young lawyers is trained in CSO law and helped many CSOs during the registration process in 2014 and 2015. Legal knowledge is also shared among organizations and often passed down from more established, experienced CSOs to newer CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 5.0 / 2015: 5.0**

With the arrival of the Islamic State in Iraq and the resulting security and humanitarian crises, CSOs began shifting their work in 2014 and 2015 towards relief and aid to displaced populations. This helped many organizations expand their existing capacities and learn to manage new kinds of projects. This also helped organizations build local constituencies, as the work of CSOs became more visible and communities became more familiar with them. CSOs also expanded their local constituencies by responding to the needs of communities affected by the Islamic State. For instance, in 2015 the Iraqi Center for Conflict Management and Negotiation Skills successfully advocated for Parliament to approve salaries for more than 20,000 public-sector employees living in areas under Islamic State control.

CSOs generally lack clear strategic plans and missions, however. This is exacerbated by funding shortages and in particular a lack of long-term funding; financial insecurity often discourages CSOs from thinking beyond their short-term survival.

CSOs’ internal management improved somewhat in 2014 and 2015. For instance, Iraqi Al-Amal Association, the Al-Mortaqa Foundation for Human Development, and a number of other CSOs adopted human resource policies, including clear job descriptions and management structures. In contrast, many CSOs still lack clear delineation of responsibilities among staff members and tend to shift tasks and projects rather than having dedicated personnel or teams. CSOs are often also subject to top-down management by a single individual who makes all key decisions for the organization. Further, in areas of conflict or severe security risks, CSOs are sometimes forced to neglect or abandon institutional systems in order to prioritize their safety and security.

Staffing continues to be a challenge for many CSOs. In 2014, a number of large, international NGOs entered Iraq and hired local staff, many of whom came from local CSOs. International NGOs are generally able to pay higher salaries than local organizations. Nonetheless, CSOs needed and were able to hire more employees in 2015 as a result of increased projects for IDPs and rebuilding of liberated areas, which required more field
personnel to undertake relief activities. Most CSOs have accountants, while only a few organizations recruit IT managers, generally on an as-needed basis. There was an increase in volunteerism, as well, particularly in the IDP camps. A 2015 survey by Mercy Corps found that 27 percent of all Iraqis participated in volunteer work, an increase from prior years. In recognition of this trend, the Kurdistan NGO Department gave fifteen grants for voluntary work in 2014, and in 2015 the Kurdistan government drafted a law to govern voluntary work.

Most CSOs in Iraq have access to basic, modern office equipment, including computers, smart phones, and Internet access.

Growing youth engagement with CSOs helped encourage use of online social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. CSOs used social media to organize low-cost advocacy campaigns, promotions, and advertising – for example to raise awareness about how to help IDPs. CSOs drew on social media to network with other organizations, as well as to gain public support, including through fundraising. Internet tools like Google Drive helped CSOs reduce costs and time involved in documenting, organizing, and archiving materials as well.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 2014: 5.4 / 2015: 5.4**

The overall financial viability of CSOs in Iraq improved somewhat in 2014 and remained constant in 2015, as both local and international funding increased, largely to support CSOs working in humanitarian aid and charity work. Government support decreased, however, particularly following the economic crisis that began in late 2014.

In 2014 and 2015, local sources provided greater financial support to CSOs, primarily in the form of donations to support work related to refugees and IDPs. A widely perceived sense of urgency and the scale of humanitarian need led to a proliferation of donation boxes in cities and towns. Some religious institutions formed their own CSOs, such as EYE Foundation for Social Welfare, which were able to collect large amounts of donations because of the support they received from religious leaders. CSOs also received some support from tribal leaders, for instance in Salah ad-Din. For the most part, local funds did not support training workshops or CSOs’ capacity-building efforts but were directed exclusively towards IDP relief. Support from the local private sector remained very limited, however. Particularly after the 2014 economic crisis, private entities were less willing or able to devote resources to CSOs.

CSOs continued to receive funding from foreign donors, including through subgrants and contracts from international organizations. This funding also tended to support mainly crisis response and relief efforts, while funds for other areas declined. The Saudi Arabian Mission donated $500 million to CSOs for support of IDPs and refugees, for instance, while the UNDP directed $130 million. UNESCO also expanded its work, resulting in more funding to local CSOs. A number of new international NGOs arrived in Iraq, some of which provided financial support in the form of subgrants to local groups; these included CARE, OXFAM, and Mission East. However many other large NGOs left the country due to the security situation. In addition, some international NGOs began implementing projects directly, without working with local CSOs.

Overall, government funding for CSOs declined in 2014 and 2015, as budgets were strained by the 2014 collapse in oil prices and resulting loss of government revenue. CSOs received modest government funding in Kurdistan, however. In 2014 and 2015, the Kurdistan’s Women Council provided forty-one grants to CSOs and the Environment Council awarded sixteen grants. In 2015, Iraq’s Ministry of Health also awarded grants to CSOs to participate in the Health Ministry’s $50 million awareness campaign about cholera. Nonetheless, such grants as well as government contracts to local CSOs were uncommon during the reporting period.

In general, members’ annual fees do not contribute significantly to CSOs’ revenues. CSOs are able to obtain revenue from services they provide, though only a few do so in practice. In Kurdistan, for instance, Iraqi Al-
Amal Association earns revenue from operating health clinics, and Al-Mortaqa Foundation for Human Development earns revenue by providing training programs.

CSOs’ bookkeeping and financial management improved somewhat during the reporting period. In prior years CSOs’ finances have lacked transparency because organizations rarely published their financial reports and budgets or otherwise made them accessible to the public. Both Law 12 of 2010 in Iraq and Law 1 of 2011 in Kurdistan require CSOs to provide annual financial reports to the supervisory government entity, which makes the reports publicly available. While few CSOs have experienced consequences for non-compliance, CSOs have been increasingly abiding by the requirement and submitting financial reports. In Kurdistan, the NGO Department began sending appreciation letters to CSOs in order to reinforce this practice and motivate CSOs to practice transparent financial reporting. There was also an increase in trainings for CSOs on financial management systems in 2014-2015. International NGOs such as Mercy Corps trained many Iraqi CSOs on improving their financial systems. Donors almost always request regular financial reports, which has led many donor-funded CSOs to engage a specialized financial manager.

**ADVOCACY: 2014: 3.9 / 2015: 3.8**

In 2014 and 2015, CSOs’ organization and implementation of advocacy campaigns, as well as their relationship with policy makers, generally improved. Some CSOs in Kurdistan enjoyed an especially positive, cooperative relationship with the government. During the reporting period, for instance, CSOs and local Kurdistan government officials worked to implement the 2013 Compact on Partnership and Development between Public Authorities and NGOs, reflecting the government’s trust in CSOs as well as local officials’ understanding of the important role CSOs play.

CSOs in Kurdistan have substantial access to Parliament and even carry out activities such as workshops inside the Parliament building, with parliamentarians occasionally in attendance. A special standing committee in the Parliament, the Committee on Civil Society Affairs, helps to facilitate such activities as well as convene direct meetings between CSOs and parliamentarians.

CSOs engaged in issue-based advocacy campaigns, some of which made considerable progress. In 2015, CSOs focused on a range of local issues, including: decentralization of power from central to local government; distribution of oil revenues to the people; activating Advisory Councils in governorates; registering IDPs and raising awareness on the rights of IDPs (the Our People Campaign, as well as the Takatuf Project); and campaigns implemented by the Handicapped Rights Legal Clinic. CSOs also engaged on environmental topics. As part of the Save the Tigris and Iraqi Marshes Campaign, the Iraqi Social Forum (a coalition of CSOs) held a seminar in 2014 with the Baghdad Provincial Council on water rights and Iraq’s national water policy, advocating against construction of the Ilisu Dam. CSOs’ advocacy campaigns comprised a diverse range of other activities, from advertising campaigns on social media to public demonstrations. There was noticeably broader participation in such campaigns in 2014 and 2015 compared to prior years.

CSOs have formed issue-based alliances and coalitions for advocacy purposes as well. In 2014, an alliance of CSOs effectively pressured the Council of Ministers to issue a plan for implementing Resolution 1325 addressing the role of women in peace processes. In Kurdistan, CSOs formed the Alliance to Support the Integrity Committee, to work with the parliament’s standing committee on anti-corruption. A large number of women-focused CSOs in Kurdistan are members of the Domestic Violence Law Women Group. New CSO coalitions formed in 2015 include the Four Electoral Networks Alliance, focused on electoral reform, and the Religious Institutions Council Alliance in Al-Muthanna, which includes CSOs and unions and focuses on reforming various provincial policies.
The reporting period witnessed several instances of successful lobbying by CSOs for legal reform, both individually and through coalitions. An alliance of CSOs successfully advocated to amend the Law on Teachers’ Unions, for instance. One of the most important campaigns in 2015, in which CSOs engaged the Ministry Council and the Pension Committee, led to the passage of a new Money Laundering Law. Organizations and the CSOs Committee in the Parliament also advocated for passage of the Labor Law and Political Parties Law, both of which were adopted in 2015. In addition, the public increasingly supported CSOs’ role in helping to shape laws through such advocacy, according to a survey conducted by Mercy Corps over the course of 2014 and 2015.

CSOs also engaged in advocacy related to legal reform affecting civil society and freedom of association. CSOs worked to develop a draft law on organizing work in clubs, for instance, and submitted the draft to the CSOs Committee in the Parliament.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 2014: 4.6 / 2015: 4.6**

CSO service provision in 2014 and 2015 focused on services for IDPs, including the provision of basic aid such as food, water, and medical supplies. Some CSOs also started documenting human rights violations inside IDP camps, at times providing legal and psychological consultation services for abused or traumatized individuals. CSOs’ enhanced participation in humanitarian relief helped build CSOs’ capacities to operate flexibly in crisis situations. CSOs also continued to provide other services, such as legal aid, healthcare services, education and literacy programs, and assistance for other vulnerable and marginalized groups. CSO-provided services were particularly diverse in Kurdistan, though there was likewise a shift toward prioritizing relief services to IDPs and refugees.

CSOs’ emphasis on service provision to IDPs reflected local priorities. CSO participation in the relief response was not only encouraged by donors but also welcomed by local populations. CSO services are often provided free of charge; CSOs generally rely on project-based budgets to recover the costs of the services they provide, rather than charging fees.

CSOs’ services typically reach beyond organizations’ own memberships, particularly when targeting displaced and refugee populations. CSOs also market services to the government. In Kurdistan, the NGO Department granted $15 million to CSOs to provide services in various fields of public work, including research on issues such as occupational safety and traffic accidents.

The government generally recognizes the role that CSOs play in service provision, particularly with regard to relief for IDPs. In light of the federal financial and economic crisis in 2014, the government relied more heavily on CSOs to help fill gaps in public services, and local government authorities especially indicated their appreciation of CSOs’ assistance. In 2014 and 2015, for instance, provincial councils began sending written acknowledgments to active CSOs, in an unprecedented sign of the government’s recognition. Some provincial councils also started directing individuals in need of help to CSOs. The Ministry of Education publicly recognized the efforts of CSOs in training faculty staff. In 2015, the government in Kurdistan approved the creation of an advisory team that includes CSOs, in a signal of its trust and recognition of CSOs’ role.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 2014: 5.2 / 2015: 5.2**

Some CSOs serve as resource centers and support other local CSOs. In 2014, for instance, the Public Aid Organization (PAO) provided support to approximately 420 organizations in the form of training, social services, and/or grants. The University of Al-Noor Foundation and Iraqi Al-Amal Association also provided
institutional support to local CSOs, namely in the form of capacity building through training workshops, knowledge resource sharing, and consultations.

Beginning in 2014, there was a marked increase in CSO coalitions’ efforts to share information, due in part to the new security threats posed by the Islamic State. CSOs faced a greater need for communication and coordination with one another in order to implement projects in areas under threat or in open conflict and did so through coalitions and online forums. One of the biggest groups on Facebook, for instance, the Iraqi Human Rights Defenders and Activists Forum, contains more than 25,000 members, including CSOs, local activists, and human rights defenders. Forum members generally share information about human rights abuses, threats to human rights defenders, and related CSO activities. Other CSO networks exist for the purpose of exchanging knowledge, such as the Peace Network, the Safety and Development Network, the Diyalah Network for Developing CSOs, and the Iraqi Conflict Prevention Network. CSOs benefited from exchanging reports through such networks and coalitions.

During the reporting period, CSOs had access to issue-focused training on certain topics such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and women’s political participation; strengthening local governance and citizenship; and recovery and re-integration for areas liberated from the Islamic State. The War and Peace Institute provided training on digital security, which is in high demand among CSOs given their increased use of online communication. Few CSOs received training on organizational capacity issues such as financial management, human resources, or strategic planning, which as discussed above is a common weakness among CSOs. In both 2014 and 2015, CSOs throughout the country had access to training manuals, including in Arabic and Kurdish. The League of Human Rights Coaches, for instance, produced seven Kurdish training manuals.

The majority of training for CSOs continues to be offered by foreign as opposed to local trainers. Nonetheless, during 2014 and 2015, local training capacity on human rights issues improved. For instance, Hivos and Iraqi Al-Amal Association held a training-of-trainers for twenty-two Iraqi human rights defenders in Erbil, Kurdistan, in August 2014. During the week-long workshop, the participants received training in human rights, as well as training skills and teaching techniques. The Iraqi Front Line organization also trained human rights defenders in Kurdistan.

CSOs formed new partnerships with both the private and public sectors during the reporting period. In 2015, for example, development CSO Iraq Builders formed a partnership with telecommunications companies Zain, Korek Telecom, and Asiacell, so that the CSO would receive donations through phone credit vouchers. In Kurdistan, public figures increased their support to CSOs engaged in activities promoting peace. In general, the government was more supportive of CSOs and willing to form partnerships as a result of the financial crisis and need for CSOs’ support. The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Endowments all entered into partnerships with CSOs. In 2014, for instance, the Ministry of Education specifically requested CSOs’ assistance in literacy programs.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 2014: 5.3 / 2015: 5.2

In 2014 and 2015, CSOs experienced a significant improvement in their public image. Public support for CSOs grew due in part to organizations’ role in mobilizing volunteers and donations to IDPs and carrying out other relief activities, which were seen as essential in a humanitarian crisis. CSOs’ implementation of economic development projects such as in El-Qosh and Zamar, which included subgrants and income generation initiatives, significantly and tangibly enhanced CSOs’ image as well. According to a 2015 survey by Mercy Corp, Iraqis also increasingly supported CSOs’ role in advocacy work, influencing laws and policies, and holding the government accountable through monitoring and other activities. By 2015, 50 percent of Iraqis said that civil
society made a difference in their lives – up from 39 percent in 2013, according to the survey. In an additional sign of enhanced public support, a number of tribal leaders and political figures endorsed CSOs in order to improve the leaders’ and figures’ own public image, reflecting the positive reputation CSOs enjoy. In 2015, the Shiite religious leadership specifically acknowledged the important role of CSO-led demonstrations against government corruption and poor public services in leading to positive change. CSOs attracted many new members and volunteers among young people during this period, as well.

Broader media coverage of the IDP crisis in 2015 led to some additional attention paid to CSOs providing humanitarian services. There was some progress among local newspapers, which began granting more space to CSOs and CSO activities. A radio station in Babylon also began to provide one hour of live broadcast for CSOs, free of charge. Nonetheless, many media outlets still only cover CSOs’ activities in exchange for a fee.

Government at the local and national levels generally has a positive perception of CSOs. In 2014, for instance, the Kurdish Parliament passed a Convention of Cooperation with CSOs and established three CSO advisory committees on women, human rights, and the environment. The President of Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, specifically thanked CSOs in a public speech after the Islamic State crisis. There is a stronger perception that CSOs’ participation in political processes and policy making, such as discussions of draft laws, increases their legitimacy. The private sector became significantly more positive toward and cooperative with CSOs as well, especially in aid distribution; for instance, some companies offered relief supplies at a discount to CSOs distributing such supplies in the IDP camps.

CSOs increasingly draw on social media to publicize their activities and build a positive public image. A number of CSOs in Kurdistan formed public relations departments in 2015. Journalists also began to cultivate relationships with CSOs, particularly to cover CSOs’ work related to political reform and policy advocacy.

CSOs have not yet adopted a sector-wide code of ethics, and very few CSOs have an internal policy of transparency with regard to their finances and activities. As noted above, not all organizations submit annual financial reports to their supervising government department, despite the fact that they are required by law to do so. However, more CSOs were institutionalizing this practice in 2014 and 2015 than in prior years.
In 2014 and 2015, Jordan continued to experience spillover effects from the conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq. The country also faced ongoing political and economic challenges, including a high unemployment rate (12 percent) and the impact of a large Syrian refugee population. By 2014, the refugee camp at Zaatari had become Jordan’s fourth largest population center, and in April of that year the government opened a second camp near the town of Azraq. While the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan slowed substantially after the government imposed new restrictions on arrivals in late 2013, according to the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNCHR), the estimated number of registered refugees in 2015 was 630,000, in a country with a total population of just over six million.

The country achieved marginal economic growth, driven by lower oil prices and reduced inflation, as well as a slightly expanded tourism sector. Poverty and unemployment rates remained relatively high, however, and the expanded refugee population created new challenges for the country’s limited
resources and infrastructure. With regard to political developments, the government continued to implement elements of the reform process it launched in the wake of the Arab uprisings. In May 2014 the government released the Jordan 2025 blueprint, a ten-year plan for economic and social development to address rising living costs, poverty, and unemployment. A new Municipalities Law was introduced in 2014 and ratified by decree in 2015, aiming to promote decentralization by shifting decision-making authority from the ministries to the governorates and increasing public participation in decision-making processes. In 2015, the government also presented a new draft Electoral Law, which would increase legislative representation of urban areas and weaken clan-based voting.

CSOs in Jordan continued to face numerous challenges in 2014 and 2015, including legal restrictions that limit their ability to engage in advocacy and lobbying, weak internal management structures, and heavy dependence on foreign donors. Nonetheless, CSOs continue to play a critical role in meeting development needs at the national and local levels, implementing projects in the fields of health, environment, agriculture, economic support, rural development, capacity building, youth activities, and good governance. During the reporting period, a number of CSOs began or expanded programming related to humanitarian relief for Syrian refugees as well.

At the end of 2015, there were a total of 4,854 registered associations, according to the Registry of Societies. Three hundred and ninety three new associations were registered in 2014, and 533 in 2015.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 2014: 5.0 / 2015: 5.2**

The Societies Law No. 51 of 2008 and its amendments continue to govern the registration and supervision of local and foreign associations. After associations are registered under Law No. 51, the Registry Council refers them to the relevant ministry for supervision. The supervising ministry depends on the type of association and may be, for instance, the Ministry of Political Development, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Environment, or Ministry of Interior. Not-for-profit companies register with the Ministry of Trade and Industry under the Companies Law No. 73 of 2010. There is also a special class of Royal Non-Governmental Organizations (RINGOs) that are registered under separate laws based on royal decrees and parliamentary endorsement.

While few CSOs are refused registration, Law No. 51 allows the government to reject registration applications without providing justification, and in 2014 and 2015 an increasing number of organizations were denied registration due to their objectives and goals. Registry officials deemed these groups’ goals to be too vague, not compliant with the local culture, or having a particular political, religious, or cultural agenda. For instance, a foreign missionary association affiliated with the Al Forsan charity was denied registration on the basis of its religious objectives. In 2015, the government also sought to limit the number of new organizations forming and registering to work with refugees in order to have greater control over their relief work. This was in part an effort to reduce the risk that funds directed to Syrians would be diverted by fraudulent organizations. There was also at least one instance of an organization being refused registration because a founding member of the CSO was involved in an ongoing legal case in the courts.

The government also moved to more forcefully implement the provisions of Law No. 51 that provide for the dissolution of CSOs: 108 CSOs were dissolved in 2014, compared with sixty-two in 2013. In 2015, a total of 189 CSOs were dissolved, either on grounds of violating the law on associations or at the request of the
organization’s governing body. For instance, the Ministry of Social Development dissolved a charity in the Zarqa governorate on the grounds that it received funds from non-Jordanian entities without obtaining prior government approval as required by Law 51.

In 2014, the Registry Council recruited an expert to review Law No. 51. Some provisions of the Law contain vague language that allows for substantial government discretion, particularly procedures for imposing penalties on CSOs, including dissolution, as well as mechanisms for political participation. For instance, the Law’s broad prohibition on CSOs engaging in “political activities” allows for a range of interpretations and gives authorities discretion in determining what activities are permissible. The expert review of the Law reportedly resulted in draft amendments, though they were not officially issued or publicly circulated during the reporting period. According to official statements, the amendments were said to be focused on strengthening the principles of CSO good governance and linking the work of CSOs with Jordan’s national development goals.

Under the Law as applied in practice, CSOs sometimes face administrative obstacles when dealing with government institutions, including delayed administrative transactions and official abuse of authority. For example, the supervisory ministry may establish a committee to conduct financial audits of CSOs. Jordan’s Prevention of Terrorism Act, amended in 2014, serves as an additional challenge to CSOs’ freedom of expression and opinion, including expression online. Under the amended law, the definition of “terrorist acts” was expanded to include the use of the Internet or any other public medium “to facilitate terrorist acts or support a group, organization, or association that commits terrorist acts or promotes their ideas or funds them.” Accordingly, a CSO that posted on its Facebook page something suggesting support for a group that “promotes terrorist ideas,” could itself be liable for having committed a terrorist act.

In 2015, the government also introduced new restrictions on charitable donations in order to prevent potential funding of terrorist organizations. Law No. 51 requires that CSOs seeking to receive funding from foreign sources must apply for and obtain approval from the Council of Ministers. The government tightened its implementation of the Law’s foreign funding requirements in 2015 by adopting a new application form that CSOs must use when seeking approval to receive and use foreign funds. The application comprises four pages of detailed questions, in addition to requiring a number of supporting documents, and creates an additional, time-consuming obstacle to receiving funding from outside Jordan.

There were no changes in the laws or regulations governing tax treatment of CSOs. However there were some calls from CSOs that they be fully exempt from taxes like governmental entities. The law continues to allow CSOs to earn income from the provision of certain goods and services, such as trainings.

In 2014, the Bar Association requested that all CSOs have a dedicated employee specializing in law, which creates an additional burden for many organizations, most of which are small in size and do not have capacity to hire legal staff. The government imposes a fine on organizations in the event of non-compliance, despite the fact that Law No. 51 does not require CSOs to staff a legal expert. Moreover, even before the Bar Association’s request, Jordan had many organizations providing legal consultancy services to CSOs, many of which were underutilized because organizations sought legal advice only when there was a need for it.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 5.4 / 2015: 5.4**

In 2014 and 2015, CSOs took active steps to engage local communities and build their constituencies, especially among youth. Some CSOs developed mechanisms to identify priority issues, such as violence and social justice. For example, the Higher Population Council worked with local partners to identify research priorities and circulated its findings to all research centers in Jordan. Youth volunteerism was generally more robust in 2014 and 2015 than in prior years, as some organizations undertook efforts to work directly with young people. For example, the Leaders of Tomorrow Foundation, founded in 2014, works to build the leadership capacity of young people and promote social cohesion among youth. In 2014 a number of national voluntary initiatives
were led by young people, reflecting the growing engagement of youth in voluntary work. The One Step at a Time initiative launched in 2014, and aims to encourage and empower Jordanian youth to participate in community service projects. The initiative will ultimately engage students at schools throughout Jordan in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.

An institutional assessment carried out by the USAID-funded Civic Initiatives Support Program (CIS-Jordan) in 2014 confirmed that CSOs do not engage in substantial strategic planning. For the most part, only large CSOs and RINGOs have the capacity to develop clearly defined plans and incorporate them into organizational decision making. Smaller groups generally only formulate institutional visions and missions. Even among those organizations that have strategic plans, moreover, many fail to commit to them or follow-up on their terms. In 2014, CIS-Jordan carried out programs to support the institutionalization of CSOs and assist them in developing strategic plans. However, the long-term impact of such programs depends on CSOs’ engagement in longer-duration projects and access to sustainable funding.

CSOs’ internal management is weak, in part because the legal environment does not provide clear guidance to help CSOs form strong governance structures. CSOs’ institutional frameworks and administrative systems, including their internal rules and regulations, are still underdeveloped.

The bulk of CSOs’ work continues to be project-based, rather than long-term, which limits the development of permanent staffing and durable administrative structures. Furthermore, in 2014 and 2015, an unprecedented number of local CSO staff left to join international organizations working in Jordan. International organizations with large-scale projects are generally able to offer higher salaries than local organizations, which often face funding shortages. The lack of long-term funding, as well as the lack of institutional frameworks and administrative systems, does not provide the job security necessary to attract and retain technical and managerial personnel. Volunteers contribute to CSOs’ workforce, but many seek compensation or a transportation allowance in exchange for their work.

CSOs’ technical advancement remains dependent on funding and the technical requirements of funded projects. Large organizations have standard modern equipment such as computers and software, printers, cell phones, and faxes, while smaller organizations rely on more basic equipment. Internet access is widely available at a reasonable cost.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 2014: 5.2 / 2015: 5.2**

There was a slight improvement in the provision of local financial support for Jordan’s CSOs from 2013 to 2014 and 2015. For example, the King Abdullah Fund for Democratic Empowerment program provided financing for a number of individual initiatives, including IT training and rehabilitation for retired military staff, scholarships for financially-needy high-achieving students at public universities, and career counseling to prepare young people to enter the labor market. Support for charitable organizations, such as the King Hussein Cancer Center and Tkiyeet Um Ali, which provides food to the hungry and needy, increased somewhat in 2014 and 2015. This support came namely from community members, philanthropists, and other donors, though the government has intensified regulation of charitable donations from non-Jordanians – which was already subject to prior government approval – out of fear that funds might leak to terrorist organizations.
The government offers support to CSOs for service provision in the form of technical consultations, capacity building assistance, and some limited financial support to cover basic costs. The Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Municipal Affairs provide additional government support for CSOs, for instance, by allowing CSOs to use municipal facilities free of charge. RINGOs generally receive more government funding than other CSOs. For instance, three RINGOs received funding from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to implement the Poverty Pockets Project, which addresses underserved communities across Jordan.

The private sector, meanwhile, provides a limited amount of support through corporate social responsibility programs. Some organizations also succeeded in raising local monetary and non-monetary support through charity and relief activities. However, Jordan’s Public-Private Partnership Law of 2014, which aims to encourage the participation of the private sector in the Kingdom’s economic development and joint projects between the two sectors, has not yet been used to facilitate the flow of support to CSOs. Moreover, in 2014 CSOs saw a decline in support provided by the private sector as several major companies created their own initiatives and programs, particularly in the area of social entrepreneurship, such as the Zein Platform for Creativity-ZINC. Umnia and Telecom, two other major telecommunications companies in Jordan, took similar steps. Such initiatives both diverted funds that might have gone to CSOs and excluded CSOs’ assistance and expertise in their implementation.

While there are no official figures for the amount of foreign funding that flowed to CSOs during the reporting period, a number of large projects supported by overseas funders were launched, including the Jordan Communication, Advocacy, and Policy Project (JCAP), and Takamol-Jordan Gender Program, both of which were funded by USAID. Other major foreign funders include the European Union (EU), UNHCR, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

A 2014 institutional assessment carried out by CIS-Jordan concluded that CSOs have not effectively diversified their sources of funding. An organization rarely receives funding from more than one or two funding sources. The limited number of funding sources for local organizations is due in part to the entry of foreign organizations into Jordan. More foreign organizations started working in Jordan in 2014 and 2015, and began absorbing funds that local organizations previously received.

Most foreign donors tend to support specific programs and projects, so local groups must often rely on periodic, short-term income as opposed to longer-term institutional support. Donor support is largely technical and monetary; CSOs generally do not seek out in-kind donations, such as buses to provide transportation for CSO activities. CSOs also generally do not attempt to increase their memberships in order to increase income from member fees. The Forum of Civil Society Organizations – a coordinating body comprising CSOs, major government partners involved in human rights, and the National Center for Human Rights – formed in late 2015 in part to explore issues of CSO funding, but it has made no concrete progress.

In addition to collecting membership fees, some CSOs charge fees for services related to health, social services, training, and legal consultancy, in order to help offset operational costs. Some CSOs have considered trying to establish endowment funds to sustain such services.

Jordan’s legal framework requires CSOs to submit annual administrative and financial reports, and CSOs generally adhere to these requirements. If an organization’s annual budget exceeds 3,000 Jordanian Dinars (approximately $4,200), it must engage an external auditor.
CSOs continued to struggle to advocate effectively and establish sustained connections with government decision makers. While coordination among CSOs increased somewhat in 2015, advocacy by CSOs in general declined over the reporting period.

In 2014, there was somewhat greater direct communication between CSOs and decision makers, including via the political parties directorate and CSOs’ representatives in the Parliament. However, these channels of communication are not organized or consistent, and most of the examples are individual efforts based on individual relationships. Moreover, there was generally a decline in the inclusion of CSOs in developing national policies and legislation. When the legislature took up the issue of decentralization near the end of 2014, for instance, it became evident that CSOs would not have a substantial role to play. CSOs likewise had only a marginal role in developing the new Municipalities Law. The draft Election Law was an exception; CSO representatives participated in developing the new draft law, and other CSO representatives submitted proposals to amend the draft in late 2015. Nonetheless, when CSO representatives are included in legislative and policy development, their inclusion often appears to be merely symbolic. Additionally, CSO representatives who participated in developing draft laws or took part in national committees in 2014 and 2015 were often chosen as individuals and not as representatives of CSOs.

CSO coordination improved somewhat in 2015 with the formation of new coalitions. For example, the Himam coalition aims to organize efforts towards sustainable development and the advancement of governance, rule of law, and human rights reforms, while the She for Parliament coalition aspires to increase Jordanian women’s share of seats in the Parliament. In 2015, She for Parliament held meetings with parliamentarians and other government representatives, and held a public workshop to educate the public about the importance of women’s participation in political life.

Despite the formation of new coordinating bodies and alliances, CSOs undertook limited advocacy campaigns in 2014 and 2015. One exception was a movement for the right to access information. The campaign was led by the Kollona AlUrdon (We are all Jordan) group, together with the Islah (Reform) coalition including the Journalists Freedom and Protection Center. The campaign was not able to achieve tangible results in 2014 or 2015, however. Likewise, The Sisterhood is Global Institute Jordan (SIGI) continued an advocacy project focused on nullifying Article 308 of Jordan’s Penal Code, which provides that an individual convicted of rape could avoid punishment by marrying his victim. Following sustained advocacy by SIGI and other CSOs to amend or delete Article 308, a Justice Ministry committee issued a draft amendment to Article 308 in April 2015 that eliminated the clause allowing convicted rapists to avoid penalty. While the Article was ultimately amended in 2016, its revision was not as broad as that advocated by CSOs.

Limited advocacy related to legal reform for CSOs was also underway in 2014 and 2015, though it did not achieve its goals. At the beginning of 2014, the Registrar Board began a series of dialogue sessions with CSOs in various governorates to discuss modifications to Law No. 51. CSOs submitted proposed amendments to the Legislation and Opinion Bureau. CSOs also actively engaged in advocacy related to the Ministry of Social Development’s application form for foreign funding. A number of individual CSOs as well as the Forum of CSOs submitted comments to the ministry opposing the form and identifying the additional burdens it places on CSO funding; however, the application form was ultimately adopted.
Civil society in Jordan provided increasingly numerous and diverse services in 2014, particularly in response to the needs of the country’s growing refugee population, though the improvement faded somewhat in 2015.

During both years, CSOs continued to assist individuals and help ease the government’s burden by providing certain public services. The continuation of the Syrian crisis and increasing number of refugees in Jordan led to greater capacity and expertise among CSOs in aid provision. Growing numbers of CSOs specialized in providing relief services to Syrian refugees, as more funding opportunities emerged targeting refugee issues. CSOs’ refugee response and service provision was especially prolific in Jordan’s northern governorates, such as Mafraaq, Irbid, and Ajloun. The Arab Women Association, for instance, provided basic goods such as food, water, and clothing, as well as health, education, and psychological services to refugees. The shift in donor emphasis to refugee and relief purposes, however, reduced funding opportunities for CSOs engaged in other areas.

Outside of emergency relief and humanitarian support, CSO service efforts range from environmental protection, such as promoting the use of solar and wind energy, to education and awareness raising. CSOs including the King Abdullah II Fund for Development and Jordan River Foundation also carried out small grants or loan programs. Individual CSOs often provide an array of services; however this diversity may come at the cost of specialization, as few organizations specialize in particular service areas.

Services provided by CSOs in 2014 and 2015 were generally in line with the needs of the communities they serve. CSOs face pressure to conform to donors’ agendas, however, which may lead their services to be less well-aligned with communities’ needs. CSOs lack sufficient operational support that might enable them to be more responsive as well. CSOs also do not regularly and consistently share information across the sector, which hinders efficient provision and use of sector services.

CSOs do not confine their services to their members, but provide services to local communities. However they are generally not effective in marketing services to other groups, such as other CSOs and academia, and as such are less effective at attracting new beneficiaries. In some cases, CSOs draw on social media to promote certain services, such as training and education. For instance, in 2014 CSO-produced websites like FOR9A (a platform for education opportunities for youth) and HAQQI (an open access information zone for legislation, research, and media) provided enhanced educational opportunities both within Jordan and in the Arab region as a whole.

Some services provided by CSOs generate revenue, in addition to offsetting costs; for instance, catering kitchens have become a successful business model. In these programs, women prepare meals, which are sold in the local community or for events organized by other CSOs, thereby both benefiting the community and creating job opportunities for women. However, funds from services do not provide sufficient revenue to cover their costs.

The government sometimes pays for services offered by CSOs. For example, in 2014 the government signed a contract with the International Organization for Criminal Reform in cooperation with For Change Academy. They formed a team to investigate care homes for orphans and the disabled, conducting unscheduled visits and submitting reports to the Ministry of Social Development, which has helped reveal problems in the care homes.
Civil society infrastructure generally improved in 2014, but declined in 2015 despite some increased collaboration within the sector and intrasectoral partnerships. The CSO sector overall faces a shortage of training resources and qualified staff who are able to provide technical and consultancy services. There are a few key sources of CSO support, however. The governmental Provincial Development Directorate and the Directorate of Productivity Enhancement provide some technical support to CSOs. The Provincial Development Directorate, for instance, oversees small development projects and helps to train CSO staff on project implementation. Some local CSOs, such as the Business Development Center, are specifically dedicated to building the organizational capacity of other local-level CSOs. RINGOs in particular, such as the Noor Al Hussein Foundation, King Hussein Foundation, and the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development, help provide intermediary services such as training and legal counseling to smaller CSOs, primarily in the capital. A variety of donor-funded initiatives are also working to build the capacity of CSOs outside of the major cities to help them compete for local and international funding. The Women Access to Entrepreneurship Development and Training Society (Wa'edat), for instance, launched an initiative aiming to help Jordanian women build fundraising skills to launch and promote their own projects.

There are a few local grantmaking organizations in Jordan. Funding for CSOs with capacity to give grants generally originates from the government or international donors. RINGOs frequently provide sub-grants to community-based organizations, most notably through the Poverty Pockets Program, which targets Jordan’s underserved areas and communities.

In 2014, collaboration among CSOs was minimal; there were few networks or organizations dedicated to facilitating information sharing among CSOs, and no overall umbrella organization or network that provided information exchange or dialogue for the CSO sector as a whole. This improved somewhat in 2015 with the creation of the Forum of CSOs, a coordinating body which includes non-governmental organizations, non-profit companies, and associations active in various development sectors. The Forum, which had thirteen CSO members by the end of 2015, aims to organize and strengthen the efforts of these organizations in achieving sustainable development, and to advance the country’s reform agenda. The Forum is also a mechanism for Jordanian CSOs to communicate, share lessons learned, and network among one another.

Some initiatives aimed to provide more targeted training for CSOs in 2014 and 2015. For example, the CIS-Jordan program launched the Internal Strengthening for Change (ISC) project in 2014, together with its Jordanian partners, the Jordan River Foundation, the Noor Al Hussein Foundation, and the Thoria Center for Studies. The ISC project provided an opportunity for community-based organizations and newly-registered CSOs to learn about the fundamentals of institutional and program management, identify capacity-building priorities, and develop long-term strategic plans. Utilizing the Societies Start-Up Toolkit developed under CIS-Jordan, the ISC project aimed to help CSOs understand and apply the principles of effective CSO management and good governance. The ISC courses began in May 2014 and took place across the Kingdom, reaching 980 charitable CSOs during its first phase.

There were few if any examples of strong intersectoral partnerships in 2014. The following year saw some improvement, with increased partnerships between the Ministry of Planning and CSOs in providing relief services to Syrian refugees. The Amman Municipality also engaged and cooperated with CSOs on environmental issues in 2015, for instance, aiming to raise public awareness about preventing litter and maintaining a clean capital. There were a few instances of CSO cooperation with the private sector, including a paper recycling project, which began in 2011 and continued in 2014 and 2015, implemented by the Jordanian Environment Society in cooperation with the telecom company Zain and transportation company Jett.
During 2014, there was some improvement in both the amount and positive nature of the coverage of CSOs in government media, including newspapers and TV, as well as private media like Roya TV. Online media contributed to the visibility of CSO activities; however, such coverage remained superficial. An Arabic-language journal entitled Civil Society Issues emerged in 2014, specialized in covering activities and issues faced by CSOs.

Despite a generally positive portrayal in the media, the public image of the CSO sector as a whole was mixed in 2014 and 2015. There was generally a positive attitude among Jordanians towards certain local charity organizations, such as the Al Hussein Cancer Center and Tikkyet Um Ali. The public’s perception of the sector seemed to sour in 2015, however, particularly with regard to refugee relief. A common theme was the accusation that CSOs exploited funding directed for Syrian refugees, and used it for personal gain. Another common complaint was that CSOs were not responsive to their local communities and existed only to provide employment for their members. A lack of public awareness about the real role and activities of CSOs, as well as internal conflicts among CSOs or CSO employees may have further contributed to a negative public image in 2015.

The government’s perception of CSOs remained mixed as well, and seems to vary from one public institution to another. An example of positive engagement is the Ministry of Planning, which has a very positive perception of CSOs. In 2015, the Ministry provided for extensive CSO involvement in local development plans in addition to the preparation and review of the government’s Jordan 2025 blueprint for national economic and social development. Nonetheless, there is broad government skepticism of CSOs, particularly those organizations that receive funding from outside Jordan. Negative perceptions of these organizations and foreign funding in general led to intensified restrictions on CSOs’ ability to access such funding in 2015, as discussed above.

Private sector organizations largely refrain from explicitly supporting CSOs or publicly addressing issues such as freedom of expression, human rights, or political participation. However, they are more likely to support issues related to the environment, youth, and women’s rights, as well as activities under royal patronage.

CSOs continue to lack sufficient expertise in marketing their activities through the media. Social media has helped somewhat to increase CSOs’ exposure, but there is insufficient professional coverage of the sector.

A few CSOs, including the Himam coalition and the CSO coordinating body, the Forum of CSOs, have adopted internal codes of ethics. There is broad support among the public and government for greater transparency in CSOs’ work, but CSOs do not always document or publicize their efforts to be more transparent. CSOs are required to submit annual reports to their supervising ministries, and generally abide by this requirement.
In 2014 and 2015, despite an unstable environment and multitude of political, economic, and security challenges, the civil society sector in Lebanon proved resilient and increasingly sustainable. Rising levels of poverty and unemployment along with widespread political frustrations contributed to concerns about growing radicalization, particularly among communities in the North and Bekaa Valley. Territorial gains by the Islamic State in neighboring Syria and a 2015 bombing attack in Beirut claimed by that group heightened the sense of insecurity. An estimated 1.3 million Syrian refugees resided in Lebanon by early 2015, creating an additional challenge for the country’s infrastructure and leading many CSOs to shift their work to address humanitarian and refugee concerns.

The legal environment for CSOs remained largely unchanged. CSOs continue to benefit from the Ottoman-era Law on Associations, which along with the Constitution provides broad protection for freedom of association. CSOs rely on international donors as their primary source of funding.
Few CSOs engage in income-generating activities and partnerships with the private sector are rare. Funding shortages and financial insecurity, along with unclear fiscal policies, made it difficult to retain highly qualified, permanent staff. Volunteerism also decreased during 2014 due to the economic situation, though there was a noticeable increase in volunteers in 2015 with the emergence of a widespread civic movement.

Lebanon remained without a president in 2014 and 2015, which slowed government action. With no president, the parliament was authorized to legislate only on matters deemed urgent or critical to national security, although this limitation leaves much discretion to governing officials. The political stagnation severely impacted CSOs’ work as they were not able to push legislators for policy reforms. Nonetheless, there were notable advocacy campaigns. The perceived failure of the government to deal with management of solid waste in Beirut inspired a massive civic movement in 2015, the You Stink campaign, which was able to mobilize large-scale public protests. The government’s forceful response to these protests, however, marked the decline of relations between CSOs and policy makers during the reporting period.

According to the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (Interior Ministry), by the end of 2015 there were 8,311 registered CSOs in Lebanon.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 2014: 3.9 / 2015: 3.9**

In 2014 and 2015 there were no changes to the laws governing CSOs; however, implementation of the laws grew more restrictive and gaps in both legislation and administrative procedures persisted.

Interior Ministry Circular No. 10 of 2006 provides that the Ministry, in conjunction with any other relevant Ministry, will first review the CSO’s file and founders. A subsequent 2008 Interior Ministry Circular provides that the General Security Directorate must also review the CSO’s file. Neither the Ministries nor the Security Directorate are subject to a time limit for these reviews, which may lead to delays. According to the 2006 Circular, the Interior Ministry may reject a CSO’s notification if it determines that the CSO either does not submit proper documentation or if its scope of work is not legitimate. If the Interior Ministry approves the notification, on the other hand, it issues a receipt to the CSO’s founders. This notification receipt formalizes a CSO’s establishment, allowing CSOs to prove their legal existence and take important steps such as opening bank accounts. As one example of the problems with the process as currently implemented, the Lebanese Internet Center (LINC), which registers domain names, submitted its notification of establishment to the Interior Ministry in 2014. The Interior Ministry then transferred the file to the Telecommunication Ministry for assessment. The Telecommunication Ministry never replied, so the organization remains in limbo, without means of proving that it submitted its notification and is therefore legally established.

CSOs working in human rights, as well as organizations dealing with other sensitive issues such as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) or environmental rights, tend to face more challenges and delays during the registration process. Centre Nassim for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture, for example, did not receive its notification receipt until 2015, despite having formed and notified the Interior Ministry of its formation in 2007. An environmental CSO called Mother Nature (Attabi3a Al Om), founded by an activist known for his activism to close a landfill in Naameh, notified the Ministry of its establishment in November 2013 but was
denied in 2014, with a finding that the group’s work would cause tension among the local communities near the landfill.

The legal environment does not address all issues concerning CSO establishment, which gives rise to additional challenges. The law does not, for example, provide clear guidelines or criteria for the processes applicable to CSOs established by presidential decree or by the Social Affairs Ministry. Another difficulty lies in the requirement that certain CSOs register with different ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs or Ministry of Youth and Sports. For the latter Ministry, for instance, conditions of establishment in some cases require that members be under the age of twenty, which contradicts the Law on Associations’ minimum age requirement.

The Law on Associations includes provisions that support CSOs’ independence and control over their internal management. The state may not interfere if a CSO seeks to change its mission, for example; founders must only notify the Ministry of the change. The Law also protects CSOs from arbitrary dissolution by the government. A CSO may only be dissolved if its term expires according to its bylaws; by a decision of its board of directors; by judicial sentence according to the penal code; or by decree if its purpose was illegal or if its members were convicted of crimes against national security.

CSOs are exempt from tax on income from grants or revenues, but the process for claiming the exemption is not clear. Likewise, CSOs are exempt from VAT and have the right to ask for full refunds of these taxes, but are very rarely able to obtain them due to a lack of knowledge about the process. There are no regulations regarding tax deductions for individuals or corporations for donations to CSOs. CSOs are able to earn income for the provision of services as long as these profits are directed towards achieving the CSO’s goals, and are not distributed to the organization’s members.

CSOs have access to legal advice but few lawyers are familiar with the nature of CSOs’ work. While organizations located outside Beirut have access to legal expertise, lawyers in the regions are less likely to be familiar with CSO law.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 4.1 / 2015: 4.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity generally improved over 2014 and 2015, as a significant increase of international funding in response to the Syrian crisis both supported CSOs’ institutional development and prompted them to expand their scope of work.

CSOs have historically struggled to build local constituencies, though they did so with somewhat greater success in 2014 and 2015. As new donor funding targeting growing numbers of Syrian refugees prompted many CSOs to shift the focus of their work, many organizations were able to build on and expand their existing capacities and networks to address the crisis, including its impact on local communities. This helped to build greater connections with local populations and increased CSOs’ visibility. Widespread, broad-based popular mobilization in anti-government protests in 2015 also helped CSOs reach broader constituencies, particularly at the grassroots level.

The overwhelming majority of CSOs have clearly-defined mission statements and goals. According to a study conducted by Beyond Reform and Development (BRD) in 2015, Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon, 78 percent of CSOs reported having organizational mission statements. Of those, 48 percent said that their activities were completely compliant with the mission statement, suggesting that many organizations have expanded their activities beyond the scope of their original goals. Those CSOs depending heavily on
foreign donors for funding are often guided largely by donors’ agendas, rather than forming and adhering to long-term, strategic plans of their own. In some cases, such CSOs adopt strategic plans, while continuing to adapt their work according to donor priorities and changing circumstances such as the refugee crisis.

The BRD study also reported that the majority of organizations have clear management structures, including clear job descriptions and delineation of duties. In addition, 61 percent of CSOs reported having a board of directors and 45 percent a general assembly. While only 17 percent of CSOs have formal internal governance policies, organizational assessments by international agencies in 2014 and 2015 helped to develop CSOs’ internal management somewhat. CSOs are increasingly incentivized to improve their management structures because donors often examine organizational capacities when making funding decisions. Even if CSOs’ written policies reflect clear management structures and good governance mechanisms, in practice organizations often struggle to implement these policies fully. According to the BRD study, for instance, 60 percent of CSO boards of directors do not hold regular meetings.

CSOs often employ staff based on short-term projects rather than maintaining permanent staff, due to a lack of sustainable funding. Most CSOs are small in terms of number of employees, with some employees contracted on a part-time basis. Smaller organizations in particular also struggle to retain professional, competent staff, as potential employees with more experience often prefer to work with larger CSOs or international organizations, which tend to offer higher salaries and greater job security than local CSOs.

The vast majority of organizations draw on volunteer work to support their activities, and 40 percent of CSOs in the BRD survey even reported having a governing body devoted to volunteers. Voluntary work decreased somewhat after the Syrian crisis, as economic conditions in Lebanon worsened and potential volunteers were more likely to hold out for paid work. Nonetheless, there was a noticeable improvement in volunteerism rates in 2015, particularly in connection with the civic movement that accompanied the garbage crisis.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 2014: 4.8 / 2015: 4.8**

CSOs in Lebanon continued to struggle with funding and financial sustainability in 2014 and 2015. With few reliable channels of support from the local public or private sectors, CSOs largely rely on foreign funding sources. This often means that CSOs prioritize donors’ agendas, which makes building long-term strategies difficult, and also keeps CSOs from cultivating alternative, domestic sources of support. Major donors include UN agencies, and US and European government agencies. In 2014 and 2015, these donors directed funding primarily towards humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees and social cohesion programs. Also in 2015, fears of growing extremism in Lebanon led donors to direct funds to activities related to countering violent extremist groups and ideologies. Many CSOs – particularly those organizations working in the North and Bekaa Valley, where communities of refugees are concentrated – changed their strategies according to donors’ agendas, particularly by introducing or expanding projects related to the Syrian crisis.

With the exception of politically-affiliated and religious organizations, very few CSOs have fundraising policies or programs. CSOs often lack sufficiently experienced staff to undertake fundraising activities such as writing proposals, or the financial resources to devote to such activities. Local sources of philanthropy exist, but only for a few organizations working on local humanitarian causes with public appeal, such as children’s cancer, as well as those Islamic CSOs that profit from zakat and are able to help sustain their operations through religious, charitable giving. Obtaining support from the Lebanese diaspora often requires a high initial investment and can be logistically difficult, as effective diaspora outreach entails travel and in some cases an organization’s legal registration outside Lebanon. Thus, in general only larger, higher capacity CSOs draw on diaspora support. The
Makassed Islamic Charity, Imam Sadr Foundation, and Safadi Foundation, for instance, have strong diaspora networks. While still rare, advocacy and development CSOs have begun holding fundraising events: The Lebanese Association for Democratic Election, SOS Children’s Village, KunHadi, Lebanese Autism Society, and Tamanna among others hold annual dinners for fundraising purposes. These events rarely bring in significant income, however.

CSOs receive little corporate support, though a small number of CSOs have started approaching the private sector, particularly banks. Organizations including the Lebanese Red Cross, Brave Heart Fund, Lebanese Welfare Association of Handicapped, Sesobel, Himaya, and Roads for Life all receive support for their campaigns from the banking sector. Organizations working on public policy reform, on the other hand, generally do not receive such support. Corporations still lack incentives such as tax deductions to provide financial support to CSOs. Few organizations have membership fees; those that do fail to obtain considerable income from membership fees.

There is a general lack of transparency regarding CSOs’ use of financial resources. Many organizations, for instance, do not declare their sources of funding. Some CSOs claim that financial management systems and the publication of financial reports require resources that they do not have. Moreover, even those CSOs that have clear financial procedures may not know how to implement them, as they have developed them only to satisfy donors’ requirements. The lack of transparency has contributed to negative perceptions of CSOs, and many face allegations of corruption.

**ADVOCACY: 2014: 3.8 / 2015: 3.7**

While CSO advocacy rarely led to tangible change in 2014 and 2015, largely due to the stagnation of public institutions and lack of legislative action, advocacy and civic action increased. Certain advocacy coalitions were able to mobilize huge numbers of people. Foremost among these mobilizations was the You Stink campaign, which emerged in the summer of 2015 to address the issue of solid waste management. The contracts of the country’s waste management company expired at the same time that the main landfill was closed, which led to piles of garbage accumulating on the roads. Tens of thousands of Lebanese from across the country participated in public protests against the garbage crisis and the government’s perceived ineffectiveness. It was the first time since 2005 that Lebanon had witnessed such massive protests. You Stink was also exceptional as a civic campaign that was able to attract widespread and diverse public support and to mobilize coordinated action among CSOs. While the campaign itself faded after security forces used force to quash the protests, it succeeded in prompting the government to put forth a comprehensive new waste management plan in September 2015.

CSOs continue to cooperate with policy makers at all levels, although cooperation often results in draft law proposals that have yet to be considered by the general assembly. Further, in practice, cooperation and coordination is difficult because there are no established mechanisms or communication channels between decision makers and CSOs. Policy-making processes are unclear and often not transparent. For instance, the discussions inside parliamentary committees are confidential. Without access to information about what happens in such sessions, CSOs depend on personal connections to coordinate with lawmakers and engage effectively in policy-making processes. The complicated political environment – particularly the continued vacancy in the presidential office – also does not favor CSO efforts to advocate and enact change, as any movements toward reform have largely stalled with decision makers declining to adopt any new policies. Some MPs and ministers do hold consultations with CSOs, though in general public institutions do not rely on CSOs for information or opinions on policy processes.
In this context, CSOs are generally more engaged and active in local rather than national policy development, especially in response to the Syrian crisis. Nonetheless, the level of engagement remains weak and is often limited to urgent responses, such as reacting to a government decision or circular, rather than engaging on long-term policy development. In most cases, broad-based advocacy campaigns are pushed by donors’ projects and thus terminated once projects end. Further, policy-making processes are slow and often extend beyond the duration of a project, and most CSOs lack the resources to follow and monitor this process to completion.

Many CSOs prefer to work on service provision rather than contribute to policy development. Those CSOs engaging in advocacy often are small and do not have large budgets allocated for mobilizing individuals or resources to conduct research or provide expertise that could be shared with policy makers. Larger organizations are generally better equipped to work on advocacy, but most of these CSOs also fail to exert much influence. According to CSOs, this is due in large part to the government’s lack of clear commitment to reform, particularly as political volatility and security challenges in the region makes reform demands by CSOs less of a priority for political leaders.

Nonetheless, in addition to the massive mobilization of the You Stink movement described above, some individual organizations achieved advocacy successes in 2014 and 2015. For instance, in 2014, advocacy by CSOs KAFA and Abaad against domestic violence helped lead to the adoption of the law for the Protection of Women and Family Members Against Domestic Violence. The same year, CSOs used innovative advocacy tools to raise public awareness about corruption; the organization Sakker Dekkaneh opened a marketplace in Beirut to “sell the country,” including merchandise such as driving licenses, government jobs, and electoral votes. Along with posters and ads throughout the city, the marketplace event helped engage individuals and encourage them to report incidents of corruption, creating data that could be shared with policy makers.

The Civil Campaign to Protect the Dalieh of Raouche (CCPDR), which formally launched in 2014, was formed by a coalition of individuals who came together to advocate for the protection of the city’s seafront as a shared public space. The campaign attracted large numbers of supporters through its activities, which included a lawsuit against the government based on a 1989 decree that had removed restrictions on development in Dalieh. In January 2015 the Minister of Environment issued a letter to categorize Dalieh as a “natural area.”

Despite these successes, joint work between CSOs remains limited. There is a strong sentiment of competition among CSOs, and advocacy successes often came as a result of individuals as opposed to organizations. Advocacy in general failed both to effect lasting change and to build a community base. CSOs also did not advocate to improve the legal environment governing the civil society sector during this period.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 2014: 3.5 / 2015: 3.4**

CSOs in Lebanon provide services in a range of fields, and in 2014 and 2015 CSO service provision generally increased as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis and in response to needs that went unfulfilled by the state. Chief among such services were medical assistance, education services, and food and other humanitarian aid. However, CSOs tend to be reactive and address immediate needs rather than have long-term plans for service programs with sustained impact. Furthermore, goods and services provided by CSOs largely follow donors’ requirements, and thus may not reflect the priorities of either local communities or the refugee population. Politically-affiliated CSOs such as the Safadi Foundation and Rene Mawad Foundation tend to focus on services related to health, education, and humanitarian relief, as providing these services in certain areas increases support for the political factions they are associated with.
Along with the general stagnation of public institutions and political deterioration in 2015, state services also declined, and in some cases CSOs shifted their efforts to fill the gap. Rather than work on enabling the public sector to improve its service provision, CSOs tended to directly provide typically state-run services such as in health care (opening clinics) and education (establishing schools).

CSOs providing goods and services that go beyond social and humanitarian needs, such as publications and expert analysis, often reach a constituency broader than the CSOs’ own members. Publications may be distributed online, for instance, and thus made available to any interested individuals, academics, CSOs, or governmental bodies. Few organizations charge fees for services, even though this might help sustain CSOs’ work.

The government and local authorities acknowledge the important role of CSOs in providing basic social services. At the local level, international donors promote cooperation between CSOs and local government authorities by requiring that CSOs engage with municipalities and other local authorities, as a condition of their funding. However this cooperative relationship is still limited to specific projects rather than long-term, strategic alliances.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 2014: 3.9 / 2015: 3.8**

In 2014 and 2015, CSOs showed greater awareness of the need to work in coalitions and use a participatory approach to engage with the private sector, government, and media. CSO infrastructure also benefitted from the investment of other countries in response to the Syrian crisis.

CSOs have access to training and technical support from intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers. Located primarily in Beirut, these support entities provide training on financial management, organizational development and capacity building, and other areas. CSOs also receive information technology support from companies such as Microsoft, Women Information Technology (WIT), MTC, and certain banks. International grants and certain corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs provide consultations to assist local CSOs on issues ranging from strategic planning to reporting. Access to such support may depend on CSOs’ access to donor funding, however, as they do not usually have sufficient funds to pay the fees for such services. CSOs tend to have greater access to international funds and expertise in the northern and eastern parts of the country, which facilitates training. Local community foundations and ISOs do not usually provide grants to address locally identified needs.

In 2014 and 2015, CSO trainings focused on issues such as organizational capacity building, financial management, advocacy, and social media skills. These were often not well-tailored to CSO needs or to the context, however. In addition, many trainings do not differentiate between the size of the CSO and the nature of its work, but provide more generalized trainings to fit all sizes and types of organizations. The more well-established training companies charge high fees, making their services inaccessible to many organizations. High-level training is also not available in the regions outside Beirut, especially when it comes to strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development. Capacity building support provided to CSOs is rarely followed up with any kind of coaching or technical assistance to make sure the training was fully implemented.

CSO coalitions exist and are growing in number. For instance, CSOs have formed the Children Rights Committee, Women CSOs’ Coalition, and Civic Campaign for Electoral Reform. CSOs often create coalitions to respond to donor requests and work on specific projects; in some cases, the coalitions dissolve after the
CSOs are increasingly aware of the importance of adopting multi-stakeholder partnerships. For instance, the Lebanese Internet Center (LINC), launched in June 2014, is a multi-stakeholder project comprising the government, CSOs, and the private sector. The initiative was jointly founded by the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Telecommunication; the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority; the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture; the Internet Society in Lebanon (ISOC); the Lebanese Internet Technology Association (LITA); Women in Information Technology; the Bar Association; and Berytech Foundation.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 2014: 4.1 / 2015: 4.0

In 2014 and 2015 CSOs enjoyed expanded presence in the media, in particular benefiting from social media and an increased digital presence. CSOs worked hard to get space and attention in the media, and found it generally easier to attract coverage in radio, print, and TV outlets. The media widely covered the You Stink protests, for instance, as well as CSO efforts to pressure parliamentarians to adopt a new domestic violence law. The warmth of the media coverage depends on the organization’s political or sectarian affiliations, as well as its agenda; CSOs that defend human rights, for instance, face greater difficulty finding space in the media. Small positive initiatives by independent CSOs also generally receive less coverage, as the media seek out more drama or scandalous stories. Media cover CSOs’ activities but do not necessarily focus on the broader positive role that they play in society.

CSOs have gained public trust as a reliable source of information, though public opinion varies, with well-established organizations such as the International Red Cross enjoying greater credibility. The public’s understanding of CSOs is incomplete; many associate CSOs primarily with charity or think that all organizations abuse funds for their own interests. However media stories highlighting success of a certain CSO or its ability to exert influence – such as coverage of the successful efforts by women’s rights CSOs to advocate for a new domestic violence law – has started to change the public perception of CSOs.

Decision makers view CSOs as a community resource, especially in regards to service provision responding to the Syrian crisis. They rely on well-known CSOs as a source of expertise and credible information. Many CSOs have proven that they are experts in their field, a reputation that is supported by the publications and reports they produce. The business sector is starting to have a better perception of CSOs as well.

CSOs work to promote their public images, but most lack know-how when it comes to dealing with the media. Very few organizations have media strategies or know how to engage effectively with reporters and journalists. CSOs are aware of the importance of having a communications officer in order to build relations with the media and public, but they do not have sufficient resources or expertise in this field. CSOs increasingly use social media to enhance their digital identity and improve their public image, which is leading to more engagement both from the media and local communities.

There is no code of ethics for CSOs and CSOs have not made much effort to demonstrate transparency to the public. CSOs have yet to embrace transparency as a norm in their operations; the annual reports CSOs produce, for instance, are mainly to address donor requirements rather than inform the public.
In 2014 and 2015, new legal and organizational provisions supporting a participatory democracy were adopted in Morocco that provide formal structures allowing civil society actors to participate in public life. The 2011 Constitution contains two provisions supporting civil society’s participation in legislation, which are the right to present legal motions and the right to present petitions. Previously, proposing and drafting laws was the sole responsibility of the government and the parliament. The new provisions thus reflect movement towards a system in which civil society informs the design, implementation, and evaluation of government actions. It is worth noting, however, that the provision allowing citizens to propose laws has limitations because some legislative domains are exclusively within the purview of the king and the government. In addition to the constitutional provisions, new regionalization laws include mechanisms for participatory democracy, such as consultative bodies at the communal and regional levels.
2014 and 2015 also witnessed the reaffirmation and strengthening of the role of civil society in advocating for social causes, such as women’s rights and improved labor conditions for domestic workers. However, despite visible CSO advocacy in 2014 and 2015, CSOs remained skeptical about the processes for collaborating with government.

The World Forum on Human Rights in Morocco was an important event in 2014. Civil society had mixed reactions to the Forum. Despite strong mobilization of some CSOs, other human rights CSOs such as the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights (LMDDH) boycotted the event because they opposed the National Human Rights Council’s (CNDH) role in organizing and mobilizing actors for the Forum.

The 2014 approval of a 2015-2030 National Strategy for Youth Integration (SNIJ) created a public framework to target youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine. The adoption of the SNIJ is an accomplishment because it aligns with the Constitution, notably with regards to the promotion of youth’s role in social, economic, cultural, and political development, and supports the integration of youth into labor markets and associative life.

In 2014, King Mohammed VI decreed March 13 a national day of recognition for civil society. However, the Call of Rabat, a movement to reaffirm the importance of civil society actors’ role in good governance and local development, boycotted the government’s celebration of the day and over fifty associations publicly denounced it. The CSOs involved in the boycott expressed their dissatisfaction with the Ministry for Parliamentary and Civil Society Relations (MCRP), which they felt was trying to legitimize the government’s consultations on constitutional provisions related to associations. The CSOs did not feel the government’s approach was sufficient.

According to a December 2014 Ministry of Interior report, there are 116,836 associations in Morocco. Ninety-three percent of these operate at a local level only, and 4 percent (or approximately 4,500 associations) operate at a national level. Of those, 202 are formally recognized by the state as public utility organizations. Critics argue that clientelistic relationships compromise the process of granting a public utility status and explain the relatively low number of organizations obtaining that status. The same Ministry of Interior report states that Moroccan civil society has grown and diversified considerably since the late 1990s, when there were only approximately 4,000 associations. There is an uneven geographic distribution of CSOs in Morocco. Three of Morocco’s twelve regions—Souss-Massa-Drâa, Marrakech-Tensift-Al Haouz, and Grand Casablanca—host 38 percent of CSOs. Conversely, just 3 percent of associations are based in Chaouia-Ouardigha and 4 percent are based in Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hsen.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 2014: 4.6 / 2015: 4.6**

The legal environment for CSOs in Morocco improved in 2014 and then stayed stable in 2015. The concept of freedom of association was first established by the Dahir (royal decree) of civil liberties in 1958 and revised in 2002. The legislation drawn from this royal decree includes the right to create associations.

Relevant laws do not constrain the right to create an association, yet in practice, local authorities may create administrative hurdles such as requesting additional documents not stipulated in the law and arbitrarily refusing requests. These authorities cite security concerns
related to terrorism and threat to territorial integrity when they delay or reject registration requests. That said, local authorities have demonstrated greater flexibility towards the creation of associations, as evidenced by the increase in the number of associations.

In general, the legal environment presents considerable limitations on the operations of CSOs. The legislation governing CSOs leaves open to interpretation many important issues such as rules regarding entering into contracts and other transactions, as well as how CSOs should manage their internal affairs. The law’s ambiguity and the lack of information on how to apply its provisions result in local authorities misinterpreting or taking advantage of the law.

In 2014 and 2015, there were several cases in which the government abused its power against some human rights organizations. For example, the Ministry of Interior accused AMDH of carrying out an “obscure agenda” and threatening the Kingdom’s territorial integrity. The Ministry threatened to remove AMDH’s public utility status, which it has had since 2000. In response, AMDH lodged a formal complaint against the Ministry for abusing its power in trying to suspend the association’s activities.

The 1958 Dahir on civil liberties stipulates that CSOs may earn revenue as long as profits are not shared among its members. CSOs do not have commercial registrations, and many do not even have a tax identification number. According to the new code of public procurement, CSOs are not allowed to respond to government solicitations. In practice, however, government entities often request proposals from CSOs within the framework of purchasing agreements or restricted competition solicitations for which they include a justification note.

The tax system treats CSOs as if they were private companies, which is a considerable impediment, as CSOs are not exempt from paying the value added tax and income tax. Only organizations with a recognized public utility status are exempt from paying sales taxes, but even that status is only granted in certain cases.

Access to legal services remains a considerable challenge for many CSOs at the local level. Some neighborhood centers, such as the Moroccan Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and the National Observatory for Children’s Rights (ONDE), have provided paralegal services in some instances. These organizations assess legal cases, provide legal advice, and even intervene in courts. However, they often lack a clear vision or system for the provision of those services more broadly.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 5.2 / 2015: 5.2**

The organizational capacity of CSOs did not change in 2014 and 2015.

The majority of CSOs struggle to identify and distinguish their objectives from those of donors. They also struggle to establish the necessary alliances and means to support their own initiatives, especially for advocacy or social mobilization initiatives.

An organization’s size and level of professionalism has considerable influence over the extent to which it has a defined organizational structure that is respected in practice. Many large CSOs that operate on a national level have professional management structures, which support the organization’s long-term management. Conversely, smaller and more localized CSOs rely heavily on volunteers who also serve as board members and manage day-to-day operations. For most CSOs in Morocco, especially smaller local ones, the board and management are combined and consist of individuals who were elected by the organization’s general assembly at its creation. Board transparency is a common topic of conversation among board members and management personnel. With the exception of periodic reports
that boards provide, most CSOs do not invest sufficient effort into sharing information internally or among stakeholders.

Few CSOs have strategic plans, which is partly related to the tendency of CSOs to focus on the goals of international donors. Insufficient capacity in strategic planning and communications, as well as a dependence on international donors, limit CSOs’ ability to be mission-driven organizations.

Many CSOs recruit and hire full-time, paid personnel. They have begun to develop human resource management systems including formal procedures for recruitment, compensation, and contract management. Some CSOs also recruit external consultants, such as independent accountants and auditors. Many CSOs use an online platform, tanmia.ma, to find staff and consultants.

The National Initiative for Human Development (a program of the Moroccan government), Takwia project, Tamkine (UN program), and even the Foundation of the Phosphate Cherifian Office (OCP) have provided CSOs with much needed office equipment, including computers, printers, and other office equipment.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 2014: 5.6 / 2015: 5.6**

Funding for associations remains a major problem that impedes the development of CSOs in Morocco. According to a 2009 report of the High Commissioner for Planning, 10 percent of associations manage 80 percent of the funding for CSOs. However, 90 percent of associations have an annual budget that is less than 5,000 Moroccan Dirhams ($510).

CSOs do not have equal access to funding opportunities, even though Internet penetration has increased access to information on these opportunities for most CSOs. There is insufficient transparency, especially with local funding mechanisms, in how resources are allocated, accounted for, and managed. Fundraising capacity differs among associations depending on their location (urban or rural), sector of intervention, personal relationships, and technical capacity in preparing proposals responding to international solicitation requirements.

The National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), a government-led development initiative launched in 2005, remains the primary funding source for local associations. Other public sector initiatives also exist, such as OCP Skills, a CSO support program launched by OCP, which is particularly active near phosphate mining areas.

In 2014 and 2015, the amount of international donor funding seemed to decline for CSOs in Morocco. CSOs’ lack of sustainable funding sources often hampers their ability to act on behalf of communities and to abide by long-term financial strategies.

Some CSOs have developed services that allow them to earn additional revenue despite the legal ambiguities in this area. These services include social analysis, trainings, production of training materials, citizen mobilization, and even capacity building for local initiatives. Government entities such as the Ministry for Social Development and companies such as the OCP call upon the expertise and knowledge of national CSOs in specific domains such as training and support for community development. At the provincial level, INDH has solicited the support of CSOs to develop new modules in organizational development, social and solidarity-based economy, and communications. With the exception of fees for joining an organization, many associations especially at the local level have difficulties collecting regular contributions from members. Most associations’ members are from the beneficiary communities and have limited income and ability to pay membership fees.
The majority of associations do not have financial accounting systems. Those CSOs with these systems typically adopt them to comply with donor requirements.

**ADVOCACY: 2014: 4.0 / 2015: 4.0**

Advocacy in Morocco takes many forms including mobilizing and raising the awareness of citizens, debating social issues, and publishing reports. Some of the many organizations engaging in advocacy are Associative Space, Carrefour Association, and the Spring of Dignity Coalition (a CSO coalition combatting discrimination and violence committed against women). CSOs played an active role in pushing for the adoption of the annual budget law for 2014 (Law No. 110-13), which sought to promote financial justice, combat fraud, and promote regional development.

At a local level, associations and social movements, such as Women’s Alternatives and the Moroccan Movement for Human Rights, launched awareness and advocacy campaigns on specific issues such as the rising cost of living, gender-based violence, and abortion. CSOs were able to effectively use the media to shed light on these issues. Through their advocacy and mediation with government, CSOs, such as the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM), helped to introduce benefits for widows and the unemployed, including the adoption on October 30, 2015 of the decree to support widows caring for children. Under the decree, approximately 300,000 widows are expected to receive between 350 and 1,050 Moroccan Dirhams ($35-$105), depending on the number of children. Additionally, following ADFM’s campaign, unemployed individuals may receive unemployment benefits under certain conditions as of January 2015. Another notable achievement for CSOs in 2014 was the progress made against legal immunity for rapists, with the repeal of Paragraph 2 of Article 475 of the Penal Code. Those provisions shielded from prosecution a man who raped or sexually abused a minor if he subsequently married her. In addition to ADFM, the following CSOs were active in realizing this achievement: the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights (LMDDH), Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH), Moroccan Association for Combatting Gender-based Violence (AMVF), and the League of Moroccan Women.

The 2011 Constitution contains provisions on CSO participation in political decision-making processes. However, these mechanisms’ modalities are still being developed through several draft laws. The thirteen articles of draft Law No. 64-14 eventually passed in January 2016, setting the conditions and procedures for exercising the right to present legislative motions. The sixteen articles of draft Law No. 44-14 establish the conditions and procedures for exercising the right to submit a petition to public authorities.

At the local level, communal charters provide the legal framework for local collectives. These contain provisions requiring these collectives to engage associations in collaboration and negotiation and draw on their expertise in specific domains. Regional councils are also required to establish consultative bodies that engage with civil society.

The number of advocacy organizations has increased with more involvement in political issues. Political research and analysis groups have also emerged. There is also increasing recognition among CSOs that networking and information sharing is important for informing and pressuring the government on social issues. Examples of networks that have been successful include the collectives for people with disabilities, Spring of Dignity Coalition, and several groups of associations combatting HIV/AIDS.

A better legislative framework for CSOs is among the demands articulated in the Call of Rabat.

CSO service provision in Morocco is increasingly focused on socio-economic development in the country’s rural and urban areas. Through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, CSOs provide health services such as psychological and physical support, drugs, and hospitalization when necessary. Other than basic social services, CSOs provide training and technical assistance in the areas of human rights, sustainable development, and democratic governance.

With the exception of a few associations and socio-professional groups serving their own members exclusively, most associations implement activities for communities according to regional or thematic priorities. Many CSOs have limited capacity for assessing and communicating community-level needs and find themselves responding to the needs of government and donors. In practice, the extent to which services and products provided by a CSO meet beneficiary needs depends on the CSO’s analytical capacity and external requirements which international donors may influence or impose.

CSOs often provide services and products to universities and the government such as trainings, publications, and workshops. The government increasingly calls upon CSOs for these types of services.

Most CSOs do not recover the costs of the products and services they deliver. Instead, they rely more heavily on projects to support their activities. Despite some CSOs’ investment in their capacity to produce and market products, they do not often ask users to pay.

The government, through the local collectivities, provides grants or subsidies for local associations within their region. In 2014 and 2015, the government recognized the value of CSOs in service provision and social development.


Overall infrastructure for CSOs improved in 2014 and then remained stable in 2015. CSOs have been able to develop information-sharing mechanisms through different communication platforms. CSOs have been particularly important in creating CSO networks such as www.tammia.ma, www.egalite.ma, www.Zagora-online, and www.E-joussour. There is also a website (www.service-public.ma) that the Ministry for Relations with Parliament and Civil Society established. These websites create space for local and regional CSOs to share information and knowledge.

CSOs have made gains in sharing content developed through these networks. Currently, local CSOs are better able to access these various sources of information given the progress in ICTs and strong human resources at the local level.

There are intermediary support organizations (ISOs) including Tammia.ma and the Moroccan Association of Solidarity and Development (AMSED) whose primary purpose is to facilitate CSOs’ access to information, training, and technical assistance across Morocco. ISOs include, and many others. ISOs aim to respond to the needs of local CSOs. At times, they earn revenue from the services they provide. Some foundations such as OCP and foundations created by commercial banks disburse donor funds to CSOs for local development initiatives.
There are competent and professional trainers in CSO management in Morocco. Training content is deemed by CSOs to be adequate and addresses the needs and expectations of local CSOs. The range of training topics is vast and includes modules on strategic management, accounting, financial management, proposal writing, and board governance. Trainings are generally offered in French and Arabic, with training in Berber less common.

CSO partnerships with the private sector have developed considerably, both because of the gradual opening of the private sector towards engaging with CSOs and the confirmed expertise of some CSOs. For example, OCP partnered with CSOs such as Tanmia.ma, the AMSED, and the Orient-Occident Foundation. Richbond, a furniture company, partnered with the Casablanca network of neighborhood associations and its food bank, a CSO.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 2014: 4.3 / 2015: 4.3**

In 2014 the visibility of CSOs on important public interest issues increased and then remained stable in 2015. Particularly visible were CSOs working to counter backsliding on social issues such as gender-based violence and abortion. For example, the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM), Federation of the Democratic League of Moroccan Women (LDDF), Alternative Citizen Movement (ALCI), and AMDH, implemented advocacy campaigns to improve public perceptions on CSOs seeking to create change on these issues. This has increased the space for CSOs to promote their positions on social issues at the local level as well.

The public generally appreciates CSOs and their activities. In recent years, the media has played a significant role in informing society of CSOs’ contribution to social development, and CSOs increasingly utilize various media outlets including print and online journals, national television, and various radio stations. There are media programs that focus on social activities, such as the national radio program called With Youth. In addition, online journals have highlighted associative activities at a local level. Media outlets tend to cover highly visible events, such as mobilizations, meetings, conferences, and other activities.

The public image of CSOs is gradually improving, which is reflected in the impact that CSOs are able to have on political decision makers. For example, the government passed favorable laws for civil society and women as a result of CSO advocacy, which included law 103-13 on violence against women, the law on child labor, and the law on the right to abortion. The government and the private sector acknowledge the value of CSOs in development and generally have a positive perception of them. CSOs are considered to be actors for mobilizing communities and as sources of information. Most CSOs try to communicate their activities and try to maintain a strong relationship with journalists.

There are well-known, national-level CSOs and networks that have considerable knowledge in the areas of ethics and good governance for CSOs; some of these have already adopted charters and codes of ethics to guide their work. Other associations continue to consider developing and abiding by such a charter or code. CSO transparency is not well developed or widely practiced. With a few exceptions, such as Transparency Maroc and Association Afaq, most CSOs do not publish annual activity and financial reports.
The West Bank and Gaza continued to endure a series of political, economic, and humanitarian crises in 2014 and 2015. Increasing tensions between Palestinians and Israelis in the summer of 2014 culminated in a seven-week Israeli air and ground campaign against Gaza. By the end of August, over 2,000 Palestinians had been killed. Israeli airstrikes left Gaza’s physical infrastructure severely damaged as well, with an estimated 18,000 houses, seventeen hospitals, and a third of Gaza’s schools severely damaged or destroyed, according to the United Nations (UN). Following the 2014 Gaza War, a series of retaliatory attacks between the two sides continued throughout 2015, concentrated in Jerusalem and focused on the issue of access to Al Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.
During this time, relations between the two Palestinian territories did not markedly improve. Shortly before the Gaza War, there were signs of political reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, and the two sides reached an agreement in April 2014 that many hoped would usher in an end to the territorial and political division. By the end of 2015, however, the agreement had had little effect, and the territories of the West Bank and Gaza remain divided.

The West Bank and especially Gaza continue to suffer from high rates of unemployment and poverty. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, by the middle of 2015, 54 percent of Palestinians were unemployed. Unemployment remains most prevalent among youth, particularly in Gaza, where according to the World Bank 60 percent were in search of work in 2015.

Against this backdrop, Palestinian civil society faces a variety of obstacles that limit organizations’ abilities to fulfill their mandates. In both territories, organizations continued to face restrictions and harassment by government officials and were further burdened by a series of extra-legal and unconstitutional actions in 2014 and 2015. CSOs increasingly adopt strategic plans but struggle to maintain democratic management systems. CSOs’ precarious financial situation exacerbates their governance challenges.

CSOs’ greatest strength remains service delivery, which has become increasingly necessary in Gaza to assist in reconstruction and humanitarian response efforts. In the West Bank, more CSOs have turned to service provision as the government there increasingly contracts CSOs to provide services. As many organizations in both territories have shifted their focus to service delivery and away from lobbying, however, advocacy efforts have declined. The infrastructure for the sector as a whole remains underdeveloped. Though many visible and influential coalitions exist, the crucial intermediary support organizations (ISOs) are vulnerable, and intersectoral cooperation is limited. CSOs continue to enjoy a positive relationship with the media, though public perception is less favorable and CSOs are viewed widely as overly dependent on foreign donors.

According to the Ministry of Interior, by 2015 there were 2,793 CSOs registered in the West Bank and Gaza. The majority of CSOs operate at the local level. A 2015 study funded by the EU, entitled Mapping Study of Civil Society in Palestine, reported that nearly half of all CSOs are headquartered in the urban centers of Ramallah, Gaza City, and Jerusalem, though they serve rural areas as well.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:** 2014: 5.0 / 2015: 5.0

On paper, CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza operate in a relatively enabling legal environment, though the adoption and implementation of restrictive regulations and policies in 2014 and 2015 introduced new challenges.

In 2014, the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in the West Bank issued a decree establishing a committee to amend the Law on Charitable Associations and Community Foundations (Law No. 1 of 2000, hereafter “CSO Law”), which is the primary law governing civil society in the Palestinian territories and is one of the most enabling CSO laws in the MENA region. By the end of 2015, however, the committee had not issued any draft amendments, nor had it engaged with Palestinian CSOs for their input on potential changes to the Law. In the meantime, government agencies and officials began applying new regulations, for example, on the mandatory submission of additional administrative and financial documents, to manage the operations of CSOs more closely. Delaying amendment of the CSO Law was widely viewed as a positive step, as CSOs feared that any new draft would be more restrictive than the current law, but the regulations are sometimes time-consuming and burdensome for CSOs to follow. The Palestinian
Authority (PA) and Hamas governments continued to enforce these measures throughout 2015. The new regulations were frequently implemented by the Council of Ministers, or by individual ministries, limiting the opportunity for input or objection by civil society groups.

Under the CSO Law, organizations must register with the Ministry of Interior in order to operate legally. However, the process has become increasingly complicated in light of the political division between the two governments. In most cases, CSOs in Gaza must register with the Hamas-staffed Ministry of Interior, in addition to the PA’s Ministry of Interior in the West Bank. This often creates bureaucratic challenges and contributes to the uncertain, quasi-legal environment in which many Gaza-based CSOs operate. In both territories, the ease of registration varies, depending on the nature of the organization. The Hamas and PA governments perform rigorous security checks to ensure that CSOs’ staff are not affiliated with their rivals, a process that often creates bureaucratic delays. Organizations in specialized sectors, such as healthcare, education, or youth services, may also have to register with the appropriate ministry according to their fields of work.

The legal environment for CSOs in East Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank is further complicated because organizations in these areas must simultaneously contend with Israeli laws and regulations. The most pertinent of these laws are the 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance and the 2005 Prohibition on Terror Funding. Under these laws and their implementing regulations, CSOs can be shut down by a court order, often issued by an Israeli military court, for undefined and often arbitrary “security considerations.” Israeli officials insist that such powers are necessary to close down organizations that are fronts for Hamas or other groups designated as terrorists, though the rationale for such broad powers is not necessarily clear.

CSOs across the West Bank and Gaza were subject to additional government intrusion in 2014 and 2015, through both legal and extra-legal means. In 2014, CSOs faced new bureaucratic requirements related to financial reporting. Officials in Gaza began requiring organizations to submit additional financial documents, such as receipts certified for compliance with laws and regulations by the Ministry of Finance, along with tax documents and other information related to the organization’s financial management and operations. Failure to abide by these requirements can result in termination. In 2015, eighty-seven Gaza-based CSOs were shuttered for failure to comply with government regulations. Gaza organizations also reported that unofficial deputies were beginning to handle registration matters and similar affairs. These individuals operate with the Ministry’s approval but are not legally sanctioned under the law. While some Gaza CSOs think that the deputies are helpful in addressing registration backlogs and bureaucratic delays, others fear that they function as “political enforcers,” ensuring that CSOs are sufficiently aligned with Hamas, and constitute further encroachment by the government.

In 2014, President Abbas issued a decree establishing the Civil Society Organization Commission. The Commission was established with the mandate of guaranteeing the sector’s independence, facilitating intersectoral cooperation, and promoting volunteerism. The members of the Commission, who have not yet been appointed, are to serve as a direct link between CSOs and the president. When the decree was issued, Palestinian CSOs were extremely concerned about the true role of the Commission and issued a statement to the President rejecting the decree. Despite the Commission’s administrative independence from the ministries, many CSOs do not trust that it will serve the sector’s interests and believe that it will actually be an additional mechanism for government control and surveillance of CSOs. Many also believe that the Commission’s mandate is too similar to that of other non-governmental entities, such as the NGO Development Center (NDC). By the end of 2015, little progress had been made in forming the Commission or launching some of its planned startup projects, which most CSOs view as a positive development.

In 2015, the West Bank government led by Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah took steps to exert increased control over CSOs. In July, for instance, the Council of Ministers decreed that the Anti-Corruption Law No. 1 of 2005 would now be applied to CSOs. The adoption of this decree burdens CSOs with additional administrative procedures and requires them to submit additional documentation, such as financial receipts. The same month, the Council of Ministers issued a decision amending Regulation No. 3 of 2010 on Non-Profit
Companies, under which a number of Palestinian CSOs are registered. The amendment adds a new requirement that nonprofit companies must obtain the Council of Ministers’s approval before accepting “any gifts, donations, aids, and funding.” The Council did not give an explanation for the amendment.

In August 2015, the government moved to close the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC). President Abbas issued an executive decree ordering the organization shut down, despite the fact that the Presidency does not possess this power. Observers noted that the decision was likely spurred by Abbas’s desire to marginalize a possible political rival in the PPC’s leadership. The decree was rescinded shortly after being issued, rendering only a temporary closure of the PPC, but the incident nonetheless produced a deep sense of unease and suspicion among CSOs.

Under the CSO Law of 2000, organizations are exempt from taxes and customs duties and have little difficulty claiming such exemptions. Additionally, individual and corporate donors are eligible under the law to receive tax deductions for donations made to CSOs. Most organizations report little difficulty having such deductions recognized by the Income Tax Department, though small and medium-sized organizations report greater scrutiny. Organizations are also permitted to bid on government contracts and earn fees from services they provide.

In reaction to new legal and practical restrictions in 2014 and 2015, CSOs have increasingly begun to document perceived abuses by the government and seek out legal aid. A number of entities in the Palestinian territories provide legal counsel; however, they are unevenly distributed across the territories and have disparate financial resources available to devote to providing legal services. Organizations that are members of broader coalitions often enjoy greater access to such aid and thus protection from abuses as a result of their membership.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 4.0 / 2015: 4.0**

Overall CSO organizational capacity remained largely unchanged in 2014 and 2015. CSOs had greater difficulty maintaining committed constituencies; this may have resulted from a trend of organizations expanding their mandates and becoming less specialized in order to increase their access to funding. CSOs also struggled to preserve their internal democratic structures, as many increasingly have temporary workers and management that is disconnected from the organizations’ constituents.

In 2015 there were some signs of increased strategic planning among CSOs. By the end of 2015, roughly 150 organizations in Gaza had adopted strategic plans, many doing so in order to satisfy donor or partner requirements. The NGO Development Center (NDC) is one entity that has helped CSOs develop capacity in strategy development. While organizations in both the West Bank and Gaza are capable of strategic planning, financial uncertainty often prompts many to limit their planning to the short and medium terms.

Overall, CSOs continued to struggle with issues related to internal governing structures and board composition. By law, a CSO must have a board consisting of no more than thirteen members, who are neither paid nor drawn from the CSO’s assembly. Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza have increasingly begun to recruit board members for their status, networks, and ability to raise funds, as opposed to organizational acumen, knowledge of local circumstances, or connection to constituents. It is not uncommon for one individual to serve on the boards of multiple organizations, raising questions about the member’s credibility and commitment. Additionally, the responsibilities of board members are often ill-defined, and members may begin to assume the responsibilities of general managers.

Organizations have access to a diverse pool of both paid and volunteer staff. CSOs have several advantages in attracting staff members: Palestinians generally have a strong sense of social responsibility; grassroots groups
have strong local connections; and some groups, such as the Palestinian NGOs Network (PNGO), maintain an online portal to publicize employment and volunteer opportunities. However, as CSOs have increasingly shifted to a project-by-project funding model, they place a higher priority on professional skills like proposal writing and project management, and the role of volunteers has become less important.

Further, for many CSOs, the need for qualified staff with experience writing proposals and managing projects often conflicts with their limited resources. Organizations will often hire professional staff for specific projects, rather than under full-time contracts. While this is a cost-efficient way to staff a project, the absence of job security makes such work less desirable for sector professionals. As a result, sector professionals may prefer to work for international NGOs (INGOs), which offer better pay and more security.

Overall, CSOs are somewhat more confident about their internal operations and management than external relations. For instance, the 2015 Mapping Study of Civil Society in Palestine, funded by the EU and conducted by a consortium of INGOs, found that nearly half of grassroots, community-based organizations (CBOs) identified “organization” and “service provision” as strengths of their organizations. Roughly 30 percent identified “community strength and trust” as an organizational strength. Civil society is growing increasingly worried about alienating its constituents, which many consider an inevitable result of growing dependence on donors and their agendas. The recruitment of board members is also a concern, since these individuals are rarely drawn from constituencies.

CSOs generally rely on outside lawyers and consultants for legal assistance and other professional services. However, smaller, grassroots organizations, such as CBOs, often have difficulty affording these services. This in turn has prompted greater information sharing among fellow CSOs.

Most organizations possess modern technology, including cell phones, office software, and Internet access. Some also engage in technological transfers, sharing physical materials as well as technological knowledge and skills.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 2014: 4.8 / 2015: 4.9**

The financial prospects of CSOs fluctuated during 2014 and 2015. Financial viability improved markedly in 2014, though by 2015 it regressed to levels observed in 2013. The improvement in 2014 is likely due to the donor response to the Gaza War, when aid to Palestinian CSOs increased substantially. The proliferation of new projects in response to the need for immediate action in Gaza proved beneficial for CSOs in the short term, but it was not sustained, and funding leveled off again in 2015 as donor priorities changed. Many organizations fear that the growing crises in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, as well as the refugee crisis in the European Union (EU), will continue to divert donors’ attention and resources away from Palestinian CSOs.

Financial sustainability remains a crucial problem for CSOs. Though organizations have been effective at cultivating multiple sources of funding, few are financially sustainable, and many exist on a project-to-project basis. Average Palestinians perceive CSOs as financially vulnerable as well: a public survey conducted by the Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) in 2015 found that 61 percent of Palestinians believed “few CSOs” are financially sustainable, defined as being able to continue operations for at least two years into the future.

CSOs are capable of building diversified revenue streams, though the impact is often limited and many organizations still find themselves primarily reliant on donors. According to the 2015 mapping study conducted by the EU, over 70 percent of grassroots, community-based CSOs identified members’ contributions as a
source of funding. CSOs may also receive fees in exchange for providing services, a common practice for organizations in the healthcare, education, and legal sectors. In the 2015 EU mapping study, roughly 40 percent of CSOs reported that service fees formed part of their revenue streams. The contributions from these resources are nonetheless often limited and in some cases amount to little more than token support.

CSOs’ ability to raise funds from local communities is hampered by the difficult economic conditions facing many Palestinians. Since 2013, unemployment has risen, while GDP has fallen. Poverty remains high, particularly in Gaza. In this economic environment, average Palestinians do not have the financial means to donate to CSOs. The 2015 AWRAD survey revealed that just over one-fifth of Palestinians think that members of their community provide financial contributions to CSOs.

Funding for CSOs from the private sector remains limited, as few companies practice corporate social responsibility (CSR). This likely reflects the limited resources of private sector enterprises in the Palestinian territories, as the practice of CSR is largely restricted to industry giants such as the Bank of Palestine (BoP), the Palestine Development and Investment Company (PADICO), and PalTel. Funding from religious institutions is rare as well.

CSOs’ increased dependence on project contracts for their financial survival has precipitated a marked decline in specialization. As CSOs struggle to compete with one another for project funding, many have expanded their mandates in an effort to broaden the pool of potential donors. In the 2015 EU mapping study, 44 percent of grassroots CSOs reported being specialized in five or more sectors, as did 33 percent of nonprofit resource centers, charities, and intermediary support organizations (ISOs). The trend away from specialization adversely impacts the quality of CSO work, limits their opportunities to develop sustained links to constituents, and threatens the perception of CSO independence among the public. To counter this trend, some ISOs have worked to develop integrated approaches for CSOs, to better equip organizations to coordinate their work in different sectors.

As mandated by law, CSOs regularly report their financial activities to the government, though these reports are not always made public. Some groups have also published their annual reports online. Most CSOs understand and meet basic requirements of sound financial management, such as keeping receipts and records, and retaining an accountant. CSOs with international partnerships maintain more sophisticated systems because they often have to comply with donor regulations and additional protocols.

**ADVOCACY: 2014: 4.3 / 2015: 4.4**

CSO advocacy increased in 2014 but diminished the following year. The initial improvement reflects organizations’ increased activity during and after the Gaza War to raise awareness and galvanize international actors to support the Palestinian people. Additionally, CSOs perceived an advocacy success in the 2014 signing of the reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah, which had been a target of civil society lobbying efforts.

However, by the end of 2015, perceptions of the effectiveness of CSO advocacy had waned. It became evident that Hamas-Fatah reunification would not be achieved, despite the agreement, and CSOs felt a decline in their ability to lobby the government and push for reform. Additionally, as time elapsed after the conclusion of the Gaza War, the international community turned its attention elsewhere in the region, depriving CSOs of a prominent platform to advocate for change.

CSOs continue to have limited space for advocacy, constrained by government restrictions and other challenges. For instance, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) had previously served as a key target for advocacy, to which CSOs could appeal on behalf of their constituents. Legislators were relatively accountable
to their constituents, and CSOs had the ability to mobilize local support to apply pressure on certain issues. The suspension of the PLC that followed the West Bank-Gaza split in 2007, however, means that CSOs must now appeal directly to the ministries and other executive entities. CSOs consider this approach less effective because ministries are more concerned about their relationship with the federal government and less accountable to or communicative with individual constituents. Accordingly, opportunities for CSOs to lobby and apply pressure have receded.

When CSOs do have an opportunity to influence the government, it is often by government invitation. While the administrations in neither West Bank nor Gaza regularly welcome political advocacy, they recognize the comparative advantage of CSOs in certain social and economic matters. CSOs are thus often invited to provide advice on national sector strategies, for instance, and have been instrumental in the drafting of the Health Sector Strategy, the Agriculture Sector Strategy, and the Labor Law. CSOs tend to enjoy a warmer reception from local government bodies, such as municipalities, which often rely on the local expertise of CSOs in developing policies. At times CSOs also exert influence as monitors of the government in international fora. For instance, a number of gender-focused CSOs in the West Bank participated in the development of a shadow report documenting the PA’s compliance with its commitments under the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which the Palestinian territories ratified in 2014.

The ability of CSOs to influence legal reform generally, as well as reform of laws governing CSOs, is limited. Organizations are aware of the significance of the law in their operations, however, and have at times lobbied for a more enabling legal environment and against government efforts to impose additional legal restrictions. In 2015, for instance, civil society representatives began working with the PA government to draft a new civil society law, though proceedings have been confidential and it is unclear how much influence these representatives wield. The Palestinian Human Rights Organizations Council (PHROC) is one of the most visible legal advocacy coalitions, consisting of organizations including Al Haq, Hurryat, and the Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Rights.

In previous years, Palestinian civil society achieved impressive victories in the field of advocacy. In 2014 and 2015, however, organizations became increasingly disillusioned with the results of past victories and pessimistic about the potential for future campaigns. Many West Bank CSOs link this growing pessimism to the change in government leadership; some believe that the partnership between civil society and the government was more constructive under the 2013 administration, with representatives and coalitions playing a larger role in policy formulation. In contrast, civil society’s role in policy formulation under the current administration has been diminished. This has not been helped by the administration’s issuance of new decrees, decisions, and statements perceived by some as inflammatory. The suspension of the PLC was particularly discouraging, because it suggested that all legal changes are now being made by executive fiat and there are fewer opportunities for CSOs to influence policy outcomes.

Organizations are cognizant that national advocacy is diminishing. In part, the decline in advocacy can be linked to CSOs’ shift away from lobbying and towards a greater focus on service provision, especially in the West Bank. National networks of CSOs exist but do not command the advocacy influence that their membership suggests because many CSOs join networks for increased visibility and access to fundraising opportunities, rather than to add their weight to advocacy campaigns. CSOs have had some success in garnering attention and support from the private sector in advocacy initiatives, such as campaigns around the Labor Law and minimum wage. However, the perception of CSO advocacy is less sanguine among citizens, roughly half of whom said in a 2015 AWRAD survey that they thought advocacy campaigns were unsuccessful in lobbying the government.

One area in which Palestinian CSOs are particularly active, visible, and effective is international advocacy. In reaction to the 2014 Gaza War, for instance, national coalitions, such as PNGO, publicly called for governments and decision-makers abroad to hold Israel accountable for its military actions. Palestinian civil society has also been one of the driving forces behind the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign, an effort to use the power of economic withdrawal to end the Israeli occupation. Organizations active in human rights, such as
the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) and Al Haq, regularly produce reports, raise awareness, and lobby international bodies to support Palestinian rights.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 2014: 3.6 / 2015: 3.7**

The capacity of CSOs to provide services improved in 2014 but declined somewhat in 2015. While the Gaza War halted service delivery in some areas, it also led to a reevaluation of donor priorities in the conflict’s aftermath and caused many organizations to shift their services to emergency relief and immediate humanitarian needs. As a result, while service delivery overall increased, Palestinians reported receiving fewer services not related to immediate relief — a trend that continued through 2015. In the 2015 AWRAD survey, for example, 31 percent of Palestinians reported receiving services from a CSO, a slight decline from 34 percent in 2014.

Nonetheless, service delivery remains one of Palestinian CSOs’ greatest strengths. The comparative advantage CSOs enjoy in this area is the result of several factors: First, many CSOs predate the establishment of the PA (in both the West Bank and Gaza) and have a long history of providing services to communities and constituents, a role the newly-constituted civil government does not wish to disrupt. Second, and especially in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, CSOs are often able to operate in areas where the central government has no presence, providing residents with needed support in health, education, and legal assistance, among other areas. Third, the government is often content with delegating to CSOs certain responsibilities to which it cannot devote logistical, financial, or personnel resources.

The provision of services in the Palestinian territories is exceptionally diverse, and CSO service providers are active in a number of social, political, economic, and legal fields. While the 2014 Gaza War prompted many organizations to shift their financial and logistical resources to the provision of services related to sanitation, healthcare, and education, a number also conducted research and analysis. The Coalition for Integrity and Transparency (AMAN), the Palestinian branch of Transparency International, regularly publishes reports on corruption, accountability, and other topics related to good governance. Al Haq and other legal advocacy groups publish reports, statistics, and analyses of human rights violations by Israel. All reports are publicly available and often receive media coverage as well.

There is little standardization across CSO service provision, and the quality of services provided by different organizations can vary substantially. Coalitions, national organizations, and INGOs have launched a series of assistance projects designed both to help boost quality and establish quality standards, though these efforts have not yet had far-reaching results.

CSOs are allowed to earn revenue from the services they provide. While most organizations that provide services related to education, healthcare, legal assistance, and similar fields collect fees, these fees are rarely sufficient to support CSOs. Moreover, organizations are cognizant of the needs and abilities of their beneficiaries, and often offer free services to those without the means to pay.

The relationship between civil society and the government in the West Bank, as compared to that in Gaza, is reflected in CSO service provision in the two territories. In the West Bank, the administration and the ministries have increasingly begun to contract CSOs to provide services. There is an apparent understanding that CSOs possess a comparative advantage in efficiency, access, and quality in certain fields. In Gaza, the CSO-government relationship is much less harmonious, and the Hamas government does not recognize or remunerate CSOs for service provision to the same extent.
CSO infrastructure improved over the past two years. In both 2014 and 2015, CSOs reported satisfaction with available training as well as intersectoral partnerships. In addition, the creation of large CSO coalitions and greater cooperation with the international community are both considered improvements for organizations.

Notable examples of ISOs in the West Bank and Gaza include the Agricultural Development Association (PARC), MAAN Development Center (MDC), the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Sharek Youth Forum, the Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center, and Defense for Children International – Palestine. According to the 2015 EU mapping study, roughly 80 percent of ISOs are involved in service provision, covering all major fields, while 60 percent are involved in information sharing, and roughly half in training. ISO trainings cover a range of topics, depending on the needs of trainees, including media and communication, strategy development, grant and proposal writing, monitoring (internal and external), leadership, good governance (anti-corruption), and quality control.

Like their grassroots counterparts, ISOs are largely dependent on international funding. In the 2015 EU mapping study, roughly 70 percent of ISOs identified INGOs as a source of funding, while another 70 percent identified international organizations. Roughly 60 percent receive funding from members’ contributions and only 30 percent from service provision. Services are offered for free or at cost, depending on the recipient or the nature of the work. For example, ISOs recruited to implement training projects by international donors may receive their payment from donors instead of trainees. These services are generally available in all major cities.

Grantmaking is not generally within the domain of ISOs but rather is conducted by national organizations, such as the NDC, or international bodies. Grants to Palestinian CSOs may come directly from EU bodies or be channeled through a domestic affiliate, such as the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Secretariat.

A number of coalitions exist within the civil society sector. The most visible are PNGO and PNGO-Gaza, AMAN, the Palestinian Human Rights Organizations Council (PHROC), the Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies (PGUCS), and the Palestinian National Institute of NGOs (PNIN). Furthermore, specialized coalitions exist to address significant issues in Palestinian society, such as gender-based violence. The most prominent of these bodies include Muntada (The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Against Domestic Violence Against Women) and Muntaqa Al-Nau al-Ijtimai (the Gender Forum). Both are based in Ramallah, though they include CSOs from both the West Bank and Gaza. Information sharing is a common practice among coalitions, though it is not a major incentive for CSOs to join. Most CSOs indicate that they would join a coalition primarily for greater visibility or increased opportunities for fundraising. Their desire to improve by learning from other organizations or add additional weight to advocacy efforts is often a secondary or tertiary concern. Cooperation among these coalitions often takes place at a high level. For instance, in February 2015, the EU along with PNGO, PNIN, and PGUCS launched the project Enhancement of the Role of Civil Society Organizations in Development, intended to strengthen the role of CSOs in advocacy, cooperation, coordination, integration, and responsiveness to citizens.

Many CSOs reported that they were satisfied with the training available to their organizations, though the scope of training programs often suffers as a result of inadequate funding. Trainings usually focus on short-term priorities, such as improving the capacity of individual CSO workers, as opposed to capacity building for organizations as a whole. Trainings are not limited to the capital cities of Ramallah and Gaza, though many occur in these locations, but are also carried out in other major population centers.
Intersectoral partnership remains weak, though certain improvements are visible. Local government bodies, such as municipalities and village councils, increasingly include CSOs in a consultative role in decisions and projects. Partnerships with the private sector are rare, however, because few companies have the resources to devote to them. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have helped somewhat, in some cases serving as a bridge to connect the CSO and private sectors. MFIs in the West Bank and Gaza are organized in the Palestinian Network for Small and Micro Finance (Sharakeh) coalition, which works directly with groups like the NDC. Individual members of Sharakeh often cooperate directly with civil society groups as well, providing grants to support activities.

Universities, including Bethlehem University and Birzeit University, remain some of CSOs’ strongest partners. This relationship generally benefits both sides, for example, when universities provide training courses for CSO personnel and CSOs provide placement opportunities or internships to promising university students. One recent point of contention has been universities’ establishment of community development centers. These centers have the capacity to become directly involved in project implementation and in some cases have developed direct partnerships with donors, INGOs, and other international actors, a development that some CSOs view as competition.


CSOs’ public image has improved markedly since 2013. The relationship between the public and organizations remains positive, facilitated by CSOs’ constructive relationship with the media. The growing use of social media by CSOs has also helped CSOs connect directly with potential beneficiaries and the public at large. While the sector’s relationship with the government remains tenuous, CSO efforts to self-regulate have improved perceptions among government officials.

CSOs generally enjoy a constructive relationship with the media, though national media attention to CSOs remains limited. Local media outlets are more likely to cover CSO issues and efforts, particularly when they are relevant to a certain segment of the population. CSO activities that directly confront Israel or the occupation also receive more exposure, but this excludes many CSOs. Many CSOs increasingly rely on social media, using platforms such as Facebook or online portals to publicize their work, which reduces the need for traditional media outlets. The Union of Journalists and other media bodies, such as the Media Development Center of Birzeit University, have provided trainings for CSOs on media engagement, communication, and other skills. Overall, these efforts appear to have borne fruit as CSOs are more effectively able to advertise their work. CSOs are aware of the positive role of media, and some engage in advertising.

The Palestinian public maintains a relatively positive perception of CSOs and appreciates their contributions. CSOs’ reputation and perceived legitimacy is increasingly threatened, however, by the perception that they are overly dependent on donors. When asked who has the greatest influence on CSO services in the 2015 AWRAD survey, 45 percent of the public identified international donors. Another 22 percent chose political parties as the most influential. Only 14 percent of respondents believed that CSOs’ boards and other decision-making bodies wielded the most influence.

The government is more skeptical of CSOs than the public, potentially a symptom of friction between the two sectors. In October 2015, Prime Minister Hamdallah made a series of remarks that appeared to accuse CSOs of corruption and mismanagement. The comments drew a unified response from leading CSOs, including PNGO, PHROC, PNIN, and AMAN, rejecting the comments and accusing the government of attempting to misrepresent their work in order to weaken the sector. The Gaza government’s perception of CSOs is not noticeably different. Both governments remain wary of CSOs’ particular political affiliations and their
connection with international backers. In general, however, local governments are more appreciative of CSOs and more often draw on them for consultation.

The relationship between civil society and the private sector remains underdeveloped. The advocacy of CSOs in actions such as the campaign for the minimum wage law or input on the labor law may draw the attention of business leaders, but this is largely an exception. CSOs continue to enjoy positive relations with trade unions, and groups such as the Democracy and Workers’ Right Center (DWRC) actively support union development. However, the affiliation of unions with the government limits the potential for this cooperation.

The trend towards self-regulation has increased in recent years. The most significant step in self-regulation was the creation of the NGO Code of Conduct in 2008, which was prepared by the NDC, PGUCS, PNIN, PNGO, and PNGO-Gaza. By the beginning of 2015, roughly 650 organizations had adopted the Code. The most prominent CSOs issue annual reports, newsletters, periodic updates, and financial reports. However, these are not always issued at a regular frequency, and some organizations have fallen behind by a year or more.
Over the course of 2014 and 2015, Yemen underwent major political upheaval, ultimately devolving into civil war with substantial foreign involvement. The country’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC) — a component of the post-2011 transition process — concluded in January 2014, after ten months. Outcomes of the NDC included a series of principles aimed at guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms, empowering youth and women, establishing a federal system, and eliminating corruption. The NDC brought together a broad swath of Yemeni society, including civil society representatives, youth, and women. However, two factions rejected the NDC’s recommendations: the Southern separatist movement and the Houthis, a Shiite militant group that had been at war with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime for many years. Outside the initial successes of the NDC, the transitional government led by President Abdu Rabu Mansoor Hadi in 2014 was generally weak and oversaw a period of domestic conflicts and a deterioration of political, security, and economic conditions.

Country Facts

- **Capital:** Sana’a
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 27,392,779 (July 2016 est.)
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $2,700 (2015 est.)
- **Human Development Index:** 160 (2015)
As the government’s capacity to provide basic services to its citizens declined, the role of CSOs in Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the Arab region, became increasingly critical. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, there were 8,421 registered CSOs at the beginning of 2014; in addition to these, the World Bank estimated that there were more than 6,000 unregistered organizations. Yemen’s CSO sector is thus large enough to be an asset to the government in helping to achieve development goals and tackle other pressing issues, such as the provision of health services in rural and remote areas where government presence is limited. In 2014, civil society embraced the opportunity to play an active role in development and service delivery and to engage in official and unofficial community activities and public dialogue. The government of Yemen also took steps to foster greater cooperation with CSOs, including the creation of a Supreme Council for Partnership (SCP) in January 2014 and hosting of the Partnership for Development Knowledge Conference in March 2015.

During the first half of 2014, CSOs strengthened their position as a critical government partner as outlined by Yemen’s Mutual Accountability Framework and its subsequent implementation mechanisms. Among other things, these instruments laid the foundation for better CSO-government engagement, promising a more favorable legal environment through modification of the CSO law. Nonetheless, the government was ultimately unable to take significant steps to follow through on its commitments before the political situation declined precipitously in the second half of 2014.

Meanwhile, political tension increasingly drove Yemen to the brink of civil war in 2014. The situation culminated on September 21, 2014, when the Houthis took over the capital, Sana’a, and seized control of certain government institutions as well as the army. In Sana’a and other Houthi-controlled areas, the Houthis began cracking down on CSOs, especially those perceived to be affiliated with the main Islamist party, Islah. By October 2014, at least fifteen CSOs had been attacked, raided, or closed, including Al Aman for the Blind and Al Thadhamen Charity Association, both of which were looted and destroyed.

In January 2015, the Houthis placed the President and Cabinet under house arrest, forcing President Hadi to flee to the South. The Houthis began exerting control over some government institutions as well, particularly through their Supreme Revolutionary Committee. In March 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched a war on the Houthis, allegedly to reinstate President Hadi’s government and combat alleged Iranian support for the Houthis. During these rapidly evolving events, CSOs struggled to remain operational, facing the constant threat of arbitrary closure and detention of their staff. The Houthis forced at least twenty-two CSOs to close in the last quarter of 2015, some on the pretext of operating without a valid registration license. Human rights CSOs, in particular, were at greater risk as they attempted to document human rights violations, such as the kidnapping and forced disappearance of human rights activists, political leaders, and journalists.

While some organizations were closed, a number of small grassroots associations emerged and provided much-needed services to local communities, including those in Aden, Al Dhale', and Abayn, where government institutions had ceased functioning due to the war, prompting individuals to form groups in order to carry out government services. However, such associations were informal, having neither management structures nor licenses.

The political and military upheaval in 2015 had a markedly negative impact on the legal environment for CSOs, as many of them were ransacked or closed. Despite challenges under the Houthis’ control, however, CSO advocacy increased somewhat, especially as many new youth initiatives emerged as active advocates. The public image of CSOs improved in 2015 as a result of the response to the growing humanitarian crisis by diversifying and expanding their services, mobilizing local funding and delivering much-needed aid to local communities. These efforts helped to enhance CSOs’ image among local communities, expand their constituency bases, and increase the number of volunteers joining CSOs.
The Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 1 of 2001, hereafter “CSO Law”) continues to govern the establishment and operation of CSOs in Yemen. The CSO Law is relatively enabling, but its implementation is problematic. For instance, the CSO Law provides for a straightforward process to register a CSO; in practice, however, the process as experienced by CSOs in 2014 was often prolonged and involved frequent and lengthy delays in awaiting responses from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSAL). In addition, MoSAL staff often demanded bribes in exchange for expediting the application process or, conversely, held back applications from groups perceived as affiliated with opposition political parties that addressed sensitive issues such as human rights or corruption. CSOs faced similar difficulties when trying to renew their registrations, which requires the submission to MoSAL of financial and administrative reports and proof that its general assembly has been holding regular meetings. For instance, Awam Organization experienced numerous delays and administrative obstruction in trying to renew its registration in 2014. Under the CSO Law, CSOs are free to work on any issue, but CSOs engaged in service delivery and charity work generally faced fewer difficulties with initial registration as well as registration renewal than those focused on human rights or advocacy.

Registration became even more difficult for CSOs in 2015, after the Houthis’ Revolutionary Committees (RCs), which were established to manage different government institutions, took control of MoSAL. No new organizations were registered in 2015, and requests for registration renewal were often rejected as well. For instance, the Yemen Humanitarian Forum faced difficulty renewing its registration and only succeeded in doing so using personal connections in MoSAL, rather than invoking the CSO Law. In a number of cases, MoSAL continually delayed or rejected a CSO’s request for registration or registration renewal and then forced the organization to close on the pretext of operating without a license. These included the Insan Foundation (which provided children welfare services), Al Takaful Association (training and social services for the underprivileged in Taiz), and Taiba Foundation (development services focused on health and education).

Article 44 of the CSO Law gives MoSAL the right to sue to dissolve an organization if it carries out a serious breach of the law. In previous years, MoSAL rarely sought to dissolve organizations, especially those located outside the capital, because it lacks the budget to conduct supervisory field visits. Formal dissolution initiated by MoSAL became more common in 2015, however, after the Houthis’ takeover of MoSAL. In October 2015, MoSAL suspended twenty-two organizations unilaterally, freezing their bank accounts and shutting down their premises. Those ordered to be closed included well-established organizations such as the National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms, the Yemen Humanitarian Forum, and the Nama Network (a network of CSOs dedicated to coordinating charitable relief and development projects). Some of the closed organizations were among those whose registration requests had been delayed or denied as well. MoSAL’s unilateral dissolution of these organizations disregarded the CSO Law’s requirements that it must first provide the organization with three written warnings and obtain a judicial decision to dissolve. The threat of dissolution effectively discourages CSOs from conducting activities perceived to be critical of the government.

The fluid political and security environment has negatively impacted many organizations and set the stage for increased harassment of CSOs. The Houthi-established RCs in MoSAL began to carry out arbitrary searches of certain CSOs’ premises, for instance, and investigations of bank accounts and any grants or donations they receive. A contingent of Houthis occupied and looted the offices of the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW) in retaliation for the organization’s affiliation with Islah, an Islamist party fiercely opposed by the Houthis. Given the circumstances, some organizations determined that they had no option but to suspend their activities – either temporarily, as was the case with CSSW, or permanently, as was the case with Awam Foundation for Cultural Development.
According to the CSO Law, CSOs are exempt from a number of taxes: they are not required to pay property tax on their premises; income tax on external investments or donations, whether in-kind or monetary; or customs tax on any equipment they purchase. However, the majority of CSOs have insufficient knowledge of the law and relevant exemptions, leaving them vulnerable to harassment and exploitation by tax authorities. For example, the Yamaan Foundation for Health and Social Development imports family-planning products. According to the law, it should not pay customs tax, but the procedures for claiming an exemption are prolonged, and approval of the claim is difficult to prove in practice, so the Foundation ultimately pays the tax in order to get its goods released from the Customs Authority. CSSW likewise was effectively forced to pay a tax to obtain equipment it had imported in 2014, despite the exemption granted by law. CSOs are also exempt from paying tax on staff salaries, yet the majority of organizations pay this type of tax due to tax authority harassment and ignorance of the CSO Law.

Individual benefactors receive tax deductions on their donations to CSOs. While this has encouraged donations, the law has in some cases been exploited. For instance, some businessmen establish and donate to their own associations in order to secure the tax deduction.

According to the CSO Law and its bylaws, CSOs are permitted to engage in income-generating activities. In practice, however, they are often prevented from doing so or subjected to tax authority harassment. CSOs’ earned income activities must also conform to national law and may not contradict the organization's goals and objectives.

The costly investment in resources and time, as well as CSOs’ lack of knowledge of their rights, deters most organizations from seeking justice. For those that do, local legal capacity is limited; few lawyers have the knowledge and skills to take on CSOs’ legal cases. Moreover, access to lawyers and legal advice is only available in large cities such as Sana’a and Taiz, if at all. Following the outbreak of war in 2015, the majority of trained lawyers fled the country or went into hiding. In addition, courts are no longer operational, and the remaining lawyers are not taking cases out of fear of reprisal by Houthi officials.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 2014: 5.4 / 2015: 5.3**

In 2014, CSOs slightly improved their capacity to meet the needs of local communities, expand their constituencies, and attract more volunteers. Increased donor funding for CSO capacity building in 2014 supported this trend. For instance, with support from UNDP, the Humanitarian Forum trained 150 CSOs in eleven governorates, focusing on institutional development and grant writing, as well as good governance, transparency, and accountability. The trainings built the capacity of 600 CSO staff members, including twenty-eight who were trained to serve as trainers, thereby enabling them to expand the training to other members. Similarly, USAID through its Responsive Governance Project (RGP) conducted various training programs for women's organizations working in rural areas in Lahij, Abyan, and Shabwa. CSOs’ organizational capacity continued to improve through 2015, as CSOs further expanded their constituencies through humanitarian and service work in local communities and attracted growing numbers of volunteers.

CSOs built on lessons about the importance of constituencies learned during the 2011 youth uprisings and how strong constituencies can attract funding and public support. In 2014, large organizations, such as CSSW, worked on developing their constituencies in various governorates, especially in small towns and villages, and succeeded in attracting support. Other organizations, including SOUL, recruited youth volunteers to assist in implementing projects, which helped build their local constituencies. Particularly in 2015, CSOs’ constituencies generally expanded as a result of their active engagement in relief work and provision of basic services to local communities.
communities to fill gaps left by the government. Increased connections to local constituencies meant that these responses were better tailored to communities’ needs.

According to a study conducted by the World Bank in 2013, many CSOs have strategic plans, as well as visions and goals. In practice, however, most organizations do not adhere to their strategic plans. CSOs often follow donors’ agendas regardless of their own goals and plans in order to access funding. Moreover, in 2015, many organizations were forced to abandon their strategic plans and embark on relief work in order to meet the urgent and dire needs of the population. On the other hand, during this time many organizations developed risk mitigation plans which focused on identifying security risks they might face when delivering humanitarian assistance.

The majority of Yemen’s CSOs have written internal management structures and policies, outlining the responsibilities of each department and staff member within the organization. In practice, however, organizations are often administered by their founders, who control every aspect of organizational management. In 2014, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) spearheaded the process of designing national accreditation standards for CSOs, and a set of national assessment tools was developed with the participation of twenty CSOs and representatives from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and MoSAL. While the participating CSOs endorsed the standardized indicators, the deteriorating political situation has hindered the initiative’s progress.

At the human resources level, CSOs suffer from chronic staff turnover, especially among highly skilled and professional employees. Compared to local CSOs, donors provide competitive salaries and attractive benefits, which attract many skilled professionals. This undermines CSOs’ operations, as new staff require additional time to develop necessary skills. Staff shortages worsened in 2015, when many CSOs had to discharge staff members because most of their projects were suspended and only a few donors agreed to reallocate funding for CSOs to carry out relief work. In addition, some staff members fled the country or moved to remote villages to escape the conflict.

The concept of volunteerism gained some momentum in 2014, yet CSOs still face difficulties in attracting volunteers. There are no regulations or other measures to ensure equal benefits for the volunteer and the organization, and the majority of CSOs are unwilling or unable to provide any reimbursement for volunteers’ reasonable expenses. This creates a dilemma for youth who seek to build their skills through volunteering, for instance, but cannot afford to finance their own transportation. A few organizations, including SOUL, a development-focused CSO, and the Youth Leadership Development Foundation (YLDF), designed programs in 2014 and 2015 to attract, train, and retain volunteers. Large organizations, such as CSSW and Al-Saleh, on the other hand, resort to personal networks to recruit volunteers. As a result, they often only have temporary or “seasonal” volunteers who provide assistance during Ramadan and Eid when charity work is encouraged and volunteers are needed to distribute food and clothing. In 2015 the number of volunteers who served CSOs increased significantly. Many organizations had to dismiss some of their staff to reduce operating costs and recruited volunteers for nominal incentives to cover the shortage in personnel.

In general, only large urban CSOs have access to modern office technology, including computers, servers, and Internet access. These organizations can also afford to purchase solar power systems to ensure a continuous power source. Most CSOs located in rural areas have limited access to basic office technology; many of them do not have computers or Internet access, because the cost is prohibitive. Further, even for those CSOs with modern office equipment, continuous power outages limit their usefulness. In 2015 CSOs throughout the country faced greater difficulty utilizing modern technology as government-provided electricity stopped altogether, and electricity was often available only for those organizations that could afford solar power systems. Many organizations used mobile phones for communication, relying on message applications such as WhatsApp, which is supported by GSM companies, rather than email. Following the outbreak of war, spare parts for PCs and laptops also became scarce due to an embargo levied by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.
CSOs’ overall financial viability remained relatively stable in 2014 but declined somewhat the following year, particularly as foreign donors reallocated their funding from development to humanitarian aid. The majority of this aid was directed to INGOs and UN agencies, such that foreign funding for local CSOs was less than expected in 2015.

The majority of CSOs in Yemen depend on funding from international donors. In 2014, as in prior years, significant funding came from international development assistance. However, the escalation of conflict and suspension of many development programs in 2015 negatively affected this source of funding. On the other hand, as the humanitarian situation worsened following the Houthi takeover in 2014 and subsequent coalition attacks in 2015, there were growing calls for more humanitarian aid from the international community. The donor community responded, and Yemen received a total of $414 million in humanitarian assistance funding in 2014 and $892 million in 2015.

While INGOs and UN agencies tended to receive the bulk of the funding from the international community (for instance, the majority of projects funded by OCHA in 2014 – fifteen out of twenty-three – were implemented by INGOs or UN agencies), a small number of local CSOs competed successfully for such funds in 2014. Other local CSOs benefited from international funding indirectly – INGOs and other UN agencies often partner with local groups to carry out project activities when the security environment limits their access to certain areas.

This trend continued in 2015. Funding from international donors for humanitarian assistance did not meet local CSOs’ expectations and needs but was primarily disbursed to INGOs and UN agencies. In 2014, for instance, local CSOs received 43 percent of the total humanitarian assistance funding, while in 2015 they received only 28 percent (including while serving as subgrantees to INGOs or the UN). Local CSOs also perceived an exaggeration of the role played by INGOs in relief work as described by local and international media, and a lack of publicity regarding the relative dearth of funding received by local CSOs. The Yemen Humanitarian Forum called for transparency in the disbursement of humanitarian assistance funds, recommending the formation of a committee comprising relevant ministries, local CSOs, and international organizations to oversee fund disbursement in an accountable and transparent manner.

Local funding for CSOs is generally limited and often only available to the few organizations with connections to business or philanthropic enterprises. Community associations formed on the basis of social homogeneity or geographic proximity, such as Alaghabra and Alarouq Association for Social Solidarity, also enjoy greater access to local funding, particularly from Yemenis living outside the country.

Private sector funding to CSOs remains modest and infrequent, although a small number of companies provide in-kind and monetary support to some organizations as part of their corporate social responsibility mandate. For instance, in 2014, the telecommunications company MTN provided support to the Yemen Development Network (YDN) to hold two training forums for over 300 YDN members from five different governorates. Yemen Mobile likewise sponsors CSO events and publications and distributes in-kind donations to CSOs during Ramadan and Eid. In 2015, as the humanitarian situation worsened, businesses and philanthropists slightly increased their funding to CSOs, enabling some groups to carry out aid projects, such as providing services to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and others affected by the war.

CSOs receive little funding support from the government. According to Article 18 of the CSO Law, MoSAL will provide financial support to organizations that have been established for a year or more and are providing public benefit services. In practice, however, this type of funding is very limited and there is no clear process or criteria for CSOs to obtain it. The few CSOs that did receive MoSAL funds in 2014 reported receiving only
around $50 to $140 per month. Further, MoSAL funding stopped altogether in 2015 as the Ministry reallocated all CSO funding to support IDPs directly.

CSO revenue from government contracts is provided for by law but rare in practice. The CSO Law allows the government to contract organizations to operate its social service centers. As one example of this, Khadija Foundation for Development was contracted in 2014 by the Disability and Rehabilitation Fund to run one of its centers. However, these types of contracts are infrequent and depend largely on the organization’s connections.

In 2015, the humanitarian situation prompted businesses and individuals to increase their donations to CSOs. However, as the economy deteriorated further as a result of the ongoing war, individuals’ and businesses’ ability to donate diminished. At the same time, the Houthis campaigned to raise funds for war efforts and imposed restrictions on CSOs’ campaigns for donations from the public. Houthis prevent CSOs from raising funds through mosques and public fundraising events, for instance, because this was seen as competing with their efforts to raise funds for military purposes.

The majority of CSOs do not have diverse sources of funding. Because most CSOs rely exclusively on international donors, the crisis in 2015 and redirection of funds forced many of them to close. This was exacerbated by diminished returns from local fundraising. In general, only larger organizations have been successful in diversifying their funding sources. Al Aman Organization for Blind Women, for instance, initiated two projects that produce income for the organization: a printing unit, which charges a small amount for the sale of its Braille books, and a cultural center, which charges for entry. Another larger organization, the Orphan Development Foundation, has a well-established investment unit with a portfolio of investment projects, including a printing unit, leather binding house, modern technology college, and factory to produce solar-heated water tanks.

CSOs must have sound accounting systems in order to access donor funding, but financial management remains a challenge, as most CSOs lack trained staff and effective reporting mechanisms. The majority of CSOs still depend on simple Excel spreadsheets to manage their finances, which is a drawback when organizations seek to apply for international funding.

**ADVOCACY: 2014: 4.8 / 2015: 4.9**

Despite early signs of a stronger partnership between CSOs and government and a more open environment for CSO advocacy, the environment for CSO advocacy in fact deteriorated considerably in the second half of 2014 and throughout 2015.

At the beginning of 2014, CSO-government cooperation increased as a result of the Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), a component of the post-2011 transition meant to guide a range of reforms, including providing for stronger partnership between government and the civil society sector. In January 2014, the government created a Supreme Council for Partnership (SCP) to help implement the MAF. The SCP had a leadership board consisting of 60 percent CSOs and 40 percent Yemeni government officials, and although it was not operational at the end of 2015, its creation reaffirmed the commitment of both sides to greater partnership during the transition period and beyond. For instance, under the MAF, CSSW collaborated with the government to form community groups in the governorate of Abyan and participated in local council meetings to identify local community needs. The government also partnered with CSOs to promote the outcomes of the NDC and solicit public support for its implementation. For instance, Khadija for Development collaborated with the NDC Secretariat to promote NDC outcomes among local community leaders in Ibb.
CSOs formed several coalitions in early 2014, as well, such as the Civil Society Alliance to Support the National Dialogue, to promote implementation of NDC outcomes. Five CSOs also formed the Advocacy for Women’s Rights Coalition to advocate for women’s political participation using the outcomes of the NDC as a frame of reference. Similarly, the sixty-member Civil Strengthening Network conducted workshops and developed short films and posters to highlight various outcomes of the NDC, including the women’s quota in parliament and federal state structure.

CSO lobbying efforts saw limited but important success in 2014. A campaign by CSOs helped lead to the appointment of five CSO activists as ministers in the newly-formed government in November 2014, for instance.

For the most part, however, the MAF’s promises of stronger CSO-government partnership never materialized, and by mid-2014 the environment for CSO advocacy began to deteriorate significantly. The Houthis’ seizure of the government largely negated CSOs’ advocacy achievements in 2014. Once in power, the Houthis imposed new restrictions on most types of activism. In particular, authorities in practice prohibited any advocacy related to human rights. For instance, the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights (MOHR) organized a public campaign in 2015 for the release of imprisoned journalists and political party leaders. Following the campaign, four of MOHR’s members were jailed for two days, and the organization’s CEO was placed under a travel ban.

As a result, amidst the political upheaval of 2015, those CSOs that continued engaging in advocacy focused on less contentious issues. Many advocacy campaigns, for instance, focused on supporting the government in its efforts to provide basic services. The National Foundation for Development and Human Rights and other CSOs also participated in a back-to-school campaign. Some CSO advocacy highlighted the destruction caused by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition attacks and included a “Stop the War in Yemen” campaign. Houthi authorities were generally receptive to and even encouraged such anti-war advocacy, while in practice preventing the majority of efforts by their opponents to campaign or advocate.

CSO advocacy increased somewhat among youth initiatives, which grew in number and impact in 2014 and 2015. There are currently over 152 youth initiatives, thirty-two of which were established in 2014, and ninety-six in 2015. Located in several geographic areas with members from diverse educational and social backgrounds, these initiatives draw on local knowledge and a heightened sense of social responsibility to advocate on a range of social issues, including education, opposition to war, and the documentation of human rights violations against the media.

CSOs did not successfully advocate for legal reforms affecting the civil society sector in 2014 or 2015.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 2014: 4.9 / 2015: 4.8**

In 2014 CSOs provided a variety of educational trainings for CSOs and youth on topics ranging from Internet governance to the documentation of human rights violations. Health care – particularly care for disabled individuals – and educational programming were also among the services provided by CSOs in 2014. In 2015, as the conflict evolved into war, international donors suspended a number of development projects or reallocated funding to relief work; accordingly, many CSOs likewise redirected their energy to providing basic services, such as delivering food baskets, water, medical supplies, blankets, and clothing to IDPs and others in need. For instance, the Yemen Civil Society Union (Omam) along with other groups launched a campaign to collect winter clothing. Ten other CSOs established the Civil Network for Humanitarian Relief to coordinate and seek funding for relief efforts.
As the humanitarian crisis escalated in 2015, CSOs became more responsive to the needs of local communities, particularly in their provision of relief services. For example, CSOs took a leading role in providing water to residents in Taiz, forming rescue squads in Aden to transport individuals wounded during air strikes, and training youth in first aid to help injured civilians in Sana’a. Organizations that were established for the purpose of serving specific clienteles or communities, such as Alaaboos, a social charity which targets the local communities in Alaaboos, and Al Hadarim, which targets Hadramis in Sana’a, were particularly responsive.

While the majority of CSOs provide services to the public at large, a small number target specific groups. For instance, the primary beneficiaries of SOUL are women, youth, and children, while YLDF focuses on youth. Some foundations, such as Khadija for Development, focus primarily on persons with disabilities but target other segments of society as well.

Only a small number of CSOs are able to recover the cost of their services. For instance, the Orphan Development Foundation trains its members in carpentry and sells the resulting products in order to recover its costs. Similarly, Yemen Red Crescent trains youth in making delivery kits for new mothers and distributes part of the proceeds. These are isolated examples, however, as the overwhelming poverty among the population discourages CSOs from charging even minimal fees.

On a few occasions the government indirectly recognized CSOs’ contribution to service provision. For instance, in November 2014 the Ministry of Legal Affairs invited 280 CSOs to participate in developing and implementing the "Strategy for Engaging Civil Society in Transitional Justice Efforts in Yemen" and thereby engaged them in achieving the country’s development goals. In 2015, the Ministry of Interior facilitated CSOs’ access to insecure areas in order to deliver relief to local communities. Nonetheless, CSOs generally feel that the government could take more tangible steps to recognize and facilitate CSOs’ delivery of services, including better coordination with relevant government institutions, access to information, and participation in public tenders.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 2014: 5.4 / 2015: 5.3**

Despite the variety of challenges faced by CSOs in 2014 and 2015, the sector’s infrastructure improved slightly both years, as CSOs formed new networks and alliances and enjoyed greater access to training.

Intermediary support organizations and resource centers do not exist in Yemen; however, networks, such as YDN, the Yemen Civil Society Union (Omam), and the Civil Society Forum (CSF), have assumed the role of supporting entities. In exchange for small membership fees, they provide their CSO members with information, capacity-building opportunities, event venues for a discounted price, and access to funding. Membership is open to all CSOs, regardless of location, which facilitates support to rural CSOs. In addition, the Civil Strengthening Network (CSN), with support from the USAID Responsive Governance Project (USAID-RGP), has completed the first phase of establishing an information center for CSOs. Its resources are currently online, but in the second phase the center will have physical premises, including a library.

CSO networks, including CSN, YDN, and CSF, also often provide sub-grants to smaller organizations. These networks allocate a portion of the funding they receive from international donors, such as USAID–RGP and Oxfam Holland. SOUL, YDN, and other organizations that receive international funding also partner with smaller associations in other governorates and provide small grants to carry out project activities.
CSO networks and alliances grew in size and impact in 2014 and 2015, as organizations appeared to realize the benefit of networking to access funding, build institutional capacity, and enhance advocacy efforts. For instance, in 2015 YDN had 426 members compared to 300 members in 2013, and CSN had sixty-one members compared to thirty members when it was established in February 2014. CSOs that are not network members seek other ways to exchange information and access funding. The Civil Society Coordination Council in Hadramawt, for example, consists of representatives from CSOs, the private sector, and local authorities who work together to identify communities’ needs and develop projects.

CSOs have some access to trainers specialized in CSO capacity building who provide training on topics including grant writing, strategic planning, advocacy planning, and conflict resolution. With the new focus on relief efforts in 2015, international donors, such as UNDP, the German Red Cross, and OCHA, worked to create a pool of CSO trainers specializing in practical relief topics to enable CSOs to carry out relief activities more efficiently and effectively. These trainers trained twenty-four CSOs on first aid provision, data collection, needs assessment, and food distribution. Also in 2015, Fujr Alamal held trainings for seven CSOs in Taiz focused on building the capacity of CSOs in needs assessments, crisis management, first aid, and safety measures. While the majority of CSO trainers are located in the main cities, the expansion of networks and alliances has improved access to trainings for CSOs located in rural areas. The quality of CSO training remains an issue, however, because there is no certification or standardized test for trainers and there is little evidence that training CSO staff has improved work quality.

Partnerships between CSOs and government institutions are still relatively nascent. The experience of some organizations indicates that government entities often assume the role of supervisor rather than partner, which may hinder project progress. Partnerships between CSOs and ministry offices in Yemen’s governorates are more successful, because they are more likely to treat CSOs as equals and facilitate project implementation. The year 2015 witnessed stronger collaboration between local government authorities and CSOs, particularly in IDP data collection and information sharing.

CSOs also increased their engagement with the private sector in 2014 and 2015. For instance, in 2014, CSSW partnered with local companies Akhwan Thabit, Bazaraa, and Al Sunidar to rebuild fifty-two houses in Abyan that had been destroyed by war.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 2014: 4.8 / 2015: 4.7**

CSOs’ public image remained relatively positive in 2014 and improved in 2015, particularly as organizations expanded their work in humanitarian assistance and relief work to aid communities affected by the war.

Media coverage of CSO activities increased in 2014 and 2015 and generally presented a positive image of CSOs. In particular, media outlets highlighted CSOs’ relief work, emphasizing the voluntary aspect of the civil society sector. Consequently, support for CSOs increased within local communities. Official (state) and commercial channels both cover CSO events; however, only a few well-connected and well-financed organizations receive official media coverage. Following the Houthis’ takeover of state media channels in 2015, CSOs reduced their efforts to seek media coverage in order to avoid being seen as associated with one political party or another, since different commercial stations are linked to different political factions.

Beyond traditional media, CSOs have become savvier at using social media to promote their work and attract supporters. For instance, the number of SOUL’s supporters on its Facebook page increased from 4,000 in 2013 to 11,800 in 2015, along with more people sharing information about its activities and participating in its
surveys. Youth represent a large segment of social media users, and CSOs’ social media successes have been accompanied by considerable growth in the number of youth willing to join CSOs as volunteers.

Government perceptions of CSOs, as portrayed in the media, were inconsistent in 2014 and 2015. Media coverage of CSOs reflected government positions ranging from praise to attacks on CSOs. Public government attacks were often based on unfounded claims of CSOs embezzling funds or having links to Al Qaeda.

The business community’s perception of CSOs has likewise been mixed. On the one hand, CSOs’ image among businesses improved as confidence grew in CSOs’ ability to deliver services. As a result, donations from the private sector increased. At the same time, the number of CSOs working in humanitarian assistance increased significantly in 2015, many of them being newly registered alliances and organizations. This proliferation led to some concerns within the business community about CSOs’ reliability and integrity in delivering relief, as well as their ability to manage donations and grants. In some cases, business executives and companies became more reserved in donating to CSOs as a result.

In 2015 the majority of CSOs intensified their engagement in relief work and devoted little effort to public relations. Further, some CSOs preferred to keep a low profile, particularly under the more restrictive conditions, and did not want their activities to be covered in order to avoid retribution. For instance, YLDF carried out several relief and development programs in 2015. While it promoted these activities on its Facebook page, only one program – an initiative to raise funds for the war effort – was covered in the media.

CSOs continue to struggle with transparency and accountability. For instance, although organizations are required to submit financial reports to MoSAL to renew their licenses, many organizations evade this requirement through bribery or personal connections. On the other hand, the growing demand by international donors for more transparency and accountability forced the CSO sector to create a system of self-regulation, and in January 2014 CSOs developed a code of conduct, which was endorsed by 150 CSOs. While that represents only a small share of the CSO sector, a growing number of CSOs have shown interest in the code of conduct and willingness to self-regulate in the future.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX
METHODOLOGY

I. OVERVIEW

USAID works in close cooperation with local CSOs to develop the CSO Sustainability Index. In each country, a local implementing partner convenes a panel consisting of at least eight representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and related experts to assess the sector’s performance in each of seven dimensions. USAID has developed indicators for each dimension, and the panel discusses and scores each indicator of a dimension, averaging these together for a preliminary dimension score. Dimension scores are averaged together for a preliminary score for overall CSO sustainability. The implementing partner drafts a country report based on the expert panel’s discussion, as well as outside knowledge of the sector.

USAID convenes an Editorial Committee, made up of specialists on civil society in the region and the Index methodology from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert. The Editorial Committee reviews the narrative and scores to ensure that scores are adequately supported, and accurately reflect the category of CSO sector development. The Editorial Committee further considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores. In some cases, the Editorial Committee proposes adjustments to the proposed scores based on the information provided and trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region overall. The Editorial Committee also raises points for clarification and requests additional information to complete the report. The project editor edits the report and sends it, along with these score recommendations and requests, to the local implementing partner for comment and revision.

If the local implementing partner and expert panel disagree with the Editorial Committee’s score recommendations, they have a chance to strengthen their narrative to better justify the proposed score. The Editorial Committee has final say over the score.

The complete instructions sent to the implementing partners, as well as the questionnaire used by the expert panels, are found below.

II. DIMENSIONS OF CSO SUSTAINABILITY

The CSO Sustainability Index measures the strength and overall viability of civil society sectors. The Index is not intended to gauge the sustainability of individual CSOs, but to fairly evaluate the overall level of development of the CSO sector as a whole. Seven different dimensions of the CSO sector are analyzed in the CSO Sustainability Index. A brief description of each dimension of sustainability follows:

Legal Environment

For a CSO sector to be sustainable, the legal and regulatory environment should support the needs of CSOs. It should facilitate new entrants, help prevent governmental interference, and give CSOs the necessary legal basis to engage in appropriate fundraising activities and legitimate income-producing ventures. Factors shaping the legal environment include the ease of registration; legal rights and conditions regulating CSOs; and the degree to which laws and regulations regarding taxation, procurement, and other issues benefit or deter CSOs' effectiveness and viability. The extent to which government officials, CSO representatives, and private lawyers have the legal knowledge and experience to work within and improve the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs is also examined.
Organizational Capacity

A sustainable CSO sector will contain a critical mass of CSOs that are transparently governed and publicly accountable, capably managed, and that exhibit essential organizational skills. The organizational capacity dimension of the Index addresses the sector’s ability to engage in constituency building and strategic planning, as well as internal management and staffing practices within CSOs. Finally, this dimension looks at the technical resources CSOs have available for their work.

Financial Viability

A critical mass of CSOs must be financially viable, and the economy must be robust enough to support CSO self-financing efforts and generate philanthropic donations from local sources. For many CSOs, financial viability may be equally dependent upon the availability of and their ability to compete for international donor support funds. Factors influencing the financial viability of the CSO sector include the state of the economy, the extent to which philanthropy and volunteerism are being nurtured in the local culture, as well as the extent to which government procurement and commercial revenue raising opportunities are being developed. The sophistication and prevalence of fundraising and strong financial management skills are also considered.

Advocacy

The political and advocacy environment must support the formation of coalitions and networks, and offer CSOs the means to communicate their messages through the media to the broader public, articulate their demands to government officials, and monitor government actions to ensure accountability. The advocacy dimension looks at CSOs’ record in influencing public policy. The prevalence of advocacy in different sectors, at different levels of government, as well as with the private sector is analyzed. The extent to which coalitions of CSOs have been formed around issues is considered, as well as whether CSOs monitor party platforms and government performance.

Service Provision

Sectoral sustainability will require a critical mass of CSOs that can efficiently provide services that consistently meet the needs, priorities, and expectations of their constituents. The service provision dimension examines the range of goods and services CSOs provide and how responsive these services are to community needs and priorities. The extent to which CSOs recover costs and receive recognition and support from the government for these services is also considered.

Infrastructure

A strong sectoral infrastructure is necessary to provide CSOs with broad access to local CSO support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing these services must be able to inform, train, and advise other CSOs; and provide access to CSO networks and coalitions that share information and pursue issues of common interest. The prevalence and effectiveness of CSO partnerships with local business, government, and the media are also examined.

Public Image

For the sector to be sustainable, government, the business sector, and communities should have a positive public image of CSOs, including a broad understanding and appreciation of the role that CSOs play in society. Public awareness and credibility directly affect CSOs’ ability to recruit members and volunteers, and encourage indigenous donors. The public image dimension looks at the extent and nature of the media’s coverage of CSOs, the awareness and willingness of government officials to engage CSOs, as well as the public's knowledge and perception of the sector as a whole. CSOs’ public relations and self-regulation efforts are also considered.
III. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index.

1. Carefully select a group of not less than 8 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts.

Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. The panel may include representatives from the USAID Mission, but they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores. They are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. The panel members should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

- local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary civil society support organizations (ISOs);
- local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business, or media;
- think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users groups;
- international donors who support civil society and CSOs; and other local partners.

It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. To the extent possible, panelists should be representative of women’s groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels.

2. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise.

The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.

It is recommended to distribute the instructions and rating description documents to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores.
for each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it may be useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The project team is very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. It would appreciate implementers recording and submitting to MSI and USAID any observations they might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool.

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

4. At the Expert Panel meeting, please remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the CSOSI should be scored according to evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events.

The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Implementers may use a table, similar to the one provided below, to track panel member scores without personal attribution. Ultimately, every rating awarded should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

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<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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5. Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description.

For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

6. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner.

Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

7. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, DC.
The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may request adjustments in scores and/or additional justification to support scores.

8. Prepare a draft country report.

The report should cover the calendar year. The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to MSI to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that the process relies on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as the project does not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts and their organizational affiliation who served on the panel with the report. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public.

While the individual country reports for the CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. In addition, the project will introduce a public launch event or electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) to promote the release of the report in implementers’ countries.

Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to MSI. The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content.

9. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and draft country reports, and will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer.

The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.” If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID representative chairs the EC.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As a final step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC. This committee is chaired by a USAID Civil Society Advisor and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), USAID Africa Bureau, USAID Middle East Bureau, and USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation and civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or
two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a large number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated Financial Viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual category of CSO sector development. Finally, and most importantly, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores.

All final scores are discussed with drafting CSOs. USAID/Washington has the final say on all scores.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare their scores with “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be fewer differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes an adequate explanation for a score will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.

V. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

**Step 1:** Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1</td>
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**Definition of CSO:**

Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

_Toward an Enabling Legal Environment for Civil Society, Statement of the 16th Annual Johns Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy Conference, Nairobi, Kenya. The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Volume 8, Issue 1, November 2005._

**Step 2:** When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

**Step 3:** When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record this overall score in the space provided.
Step 4: Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. If after reviewing “Ratings: A Closer Look” you determine that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension.

Step 5: Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and discussion.

SCORING SCALE:

The *CSO Sustainability Index* uses a seven-point scale to facilitate comparisons to the Freedom House indices, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector's sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2. The civil society sector's sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3. The civil society sector's sustainability is somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4. The civil society sector's sustainability is minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5. The civil society sector's sustainability is somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6. The civil society sector's sustainability is impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7. The civil society sector's sustainability is significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.

For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to “Ratings: A Closer Look” below.

VI. DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS

The following section is the worksheet that members of the Expert Panel use to keep track of the scores they propose for each indicator of each dimension. Each panel member should rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on a scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very
advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

- **REGISTRATION.** Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?

- **OPERATION.** Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?

- **ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARASSMENT.** Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?

- **LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY.** Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

- **TAXATION.** Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

- **EARNED INCOME.** Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**

- **CONSTITUENCY BUILDING.** Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?

- **STRATEGIC PLANNING.** Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?

- **INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.** Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?

- **CSO STAFFING.** Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

- **TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT.** Do CSOs' resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.?)
FINANCIAL VIABILITY

- **LOCAL SUPPORT:** Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

- **DIVERSIFICATION:** Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

- **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:** Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

- **FUNDRAISING:** Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

- **EARNED INCOME:** Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

ADVOCACY

- **COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:** Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

- **POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES:** Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

- **LOBBYING EFFORTS:** Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? (Please provide examples, if relevant.)

- **LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM:** Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc.?

SERVICE PROVISION

- **RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES:** Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water, or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified?

- **COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS:** Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?
• **CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.** Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches, or government?

• **COST RECOVERY.** When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

• **GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT.** Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

• **INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS.** Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training, and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

• **LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS.** Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

• **CSO COALITIONS.** Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

• **TRAINING.** Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

• **INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS.** Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

**PUBLIC IMAGE**

• **MEDIA COVERAGE.** Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

• **PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?
• **GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS.** Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

• **PUBLIC RELATIONS.** Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

• **SELF-REGULATION.** Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

**VII. RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK**

The following section goes into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector's development. These characteristics and categories are drawn from empirical observations of the sector's development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic categories: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced category, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving category corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded category, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

**Sustainability Evolving:** CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.

**Sustainability Impeded:** The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.
**Sustainability Evolving:** Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

**Sustainability Impeded:** CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. In this category, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

**Sustainability Evolving:** CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

**Sustainability Impeded:** New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

**ADVOCACY**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; 2) monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this category of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.

**Sustainability Evolving:** Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies"). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.
**Sustainability Impeded:** Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries in this category have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism, or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

**SERVICE PROVISION**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

**Sustainability Evolving:** The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

**Sustainability Impeded:** A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants, and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship, and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

**Sustainability Evolving:** ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors' forums are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.
**Sustainability Impeded:** There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail, and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising, or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

**PUBLIC IMAGE**

**Sustainability Enhanced:** This category is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

**Sustainability Evolving:** The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

**Sustainability Impeded:** The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "nongovernmental," "nonprofit," or "civil society," including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
# ANNEX B: CSOSI 2014/2015 DATA

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## 2014/2015 Middle East and North Africa

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